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I. Introduction 
It is a commonplace that a federal or transnational 
union of states is one way to promote legal integration. 
~I 
Both the United States and the European Community to 
take only the two unions principally concerned in this 
study -- were founded in part to promote greater legal 
harmony, and the same is no doubt true of other federal 
systems. It is probably a further commonplace that little 
actual integration among members of a federal or transnational 
union of states can take place without judicial assistance. 
Judges do, after all, apply laws. Yet, the questions that 
· often demand judicial answers in the federal or 
transnational union, as well as the nature and limits of 
the - judicial role in a federal or transnational system of 
government, are complex and deserve critical analysis and 
the careful attention of anyone interested in federalism, 
transnationalism and legal integration. Let us begin by 
outlining some of these questions. 
A. Supremacy 
Legal integration requires, conceptually 
of course, no more than the uniform application and 
enforcement of a law in more than one nation or state. One 
could, it is true, achieve this result through national 
- 2 -
conquests or mergers, with all government power being 
simply assumed by a central government. But one may 
doubt the desirability of this course and thus settle 
for the federal or transnational union in which 
government powers are divided or shared among several 
sovereigns: state and federal as in the United State~ or 
national and transnational as in the European Community. 
Now,it is evident that in such a union the laws of the 
federal or transnational government will sometimes conflict 
with those of a member state. When this occurs, as people 
cannot reasonably -be expected to obey at the same time 
two conflicting commands, the law of one sovereign must 
apply at the expense of the law of the other, and in the 
federal or transnational union, if the union and 
integration -~ are to be meaningful, it must be the 
federal or transnational law that is supreme. Without 
this supremacy, the federal or transnational law can 
have no direct integrative force. 
l l 1 
Legal integration in the federal or transnational 
union requires first and foremost, therefore, acceptance 
of a legal hierarchy. The federal or transnational law 
when it conflicts with the law of a member state must be 
deemed to be "higher" law, and must apply at the expense 
of the conflicting national law. Although this principle 
• 
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of supremacy is itself frequently declared in the 
constitution or treaty establishing the union, application 
of the principle depends on those who apply the law. 
Maintaining the supremacy of the federal or transnational law 
must be, therefore, the initial contribution of the 
judiciary to legal integration in the federal or 
transnational union. Indeed, without judicial review, or 
some similar instrument of control, the supremacy of the · 
federal or transnational law must remain at best theoretical, 
and its force merely exhortatory. ~/ And, if the 
constitution or treaty establishing the union fails to 
clearly establish the supremacy of the federal or 
transnational law, the challenge to the judiciary on this 
question will, of course, be all the greater. 
B. Powers 
The principle of supremacy does not mean, 
however, centralization of power in the federal or 
transnational union. To the contrary, federalism and 
transnationalism both presuppose to some degree the 
decentralization or sharing of power. There are good 
reasons for this. Harmonization of the law among nations 
or states may be a more or less worthy goal depending on 
many factors. Not every area of the law equally demands 
- 4 -
harmonization, and in many areas local control affords 
a flexibility, a responsiveness to the desires of citizens 
in different regions with different values, that surely 
outweigh any benefits of harmonization. In any federal 
or transnational union, therefore, a second fundamental 
question will concern the division of law-making powers 
and responsibilities amonq the different sovereigns. 
J l 
This division of powers is initially, of course, 
a responsibility of the constitutional draftsmen, and 
every constitution or treaty establishing a federal or 
transnational union in some manner defines the powers 
granted and retained by the constituent states or nations. 
Important questions inevitably remain, however, questions 
which sooner or later also demand judicial attention in 
any federal or transnational union. Some of these 
questions arise simply from the natural imprecision of 
language--~-~·, what is the meaning of ~commerce" in the 
commerce clause of the u.s. Constitution? what federal 
~ or transnational powers, if any, may be implied from those 
explicitly granted in the constitution or treaty? 
Another set of questions concerns the nature of 
the powers granted. For example, which powers reside 
exclusively in the federal or transnational government 
and which are held concurrently or partially concurrently 




does an exercise of power by the federal or transnational 
government preempt those powers held concurrently by the 
the basic issue of 
member states? While/supremacy does not allow of 
compromise in any meaningful federal or transnational mrlan, 
these ~~questions concerning the division of power 
can only be answered after careful consideration of the 
often competing claims of uniformity and diversity. 
c. Judicial Procedure 
A federal or transnational union 
also presents procedural challen~,JL/ challenges that are 
in large measure corollaries of the principle of supremacy. 
One of these corollaries is that, if federal or 
transnational law is to be supreme, there must be a final 
interpreter of federal law with the power of binding the 
governments and courts of the member states. For, if ~~ere 
is no ultimate voice and governments and courts of the 
member states are free to adopt whatever interpretation 
of federal law best suits their purposes, the principle 
of supremacy, and integration --which to some degree must 
mean uniformity of application and effect among member 
states -- will risk great subversion. Another of these 
corollaries, also flowing from this need for uniformity 
of application and effect, is that supremacy and integration 
must mean harmonization not just of laws, but also of the 
means of making laws effective.~/ For although the text 
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of the law may read the same in two countries, the rights 
of the citizens of those same countries will .differ if 
their courts are unequally available for the vindication 
to judicial ~ and 
of those rights. The more unequal the access I the more 
varied the legal systems, the more formidable will be the 
problem. It potentially will be a compelling problem 
indeed, therefore, in the federal or transnational union 
comprising countries with different legal traditions and 
varied judicial customs. 
-· \ 
~ 
However, these very differences in legal traditions, 
i~stitutions and judicial customs suggest that this access-
to-justice problem confronting legal integration in the 
federal or transnational syste~ does not permit a monolithic 
solution. Both realism and good sense CC1JCSel that illp:lsinq unifo:cn 
procedures for all courts in a union comprising diverse 
legal traditions is neither possible nor desirable. Thus, 
while believing that the legal systems in the federal or 
transnational union must in some way •afford centralized 
control of the interpretation of federal or transnational 
law, one must also accept that the rules governing access 
to the courts be flexible and sensitive to legitimate 
demands for diversity and national autonomy. 
- 7 -
D. Fundamental Ri.gh ts 
So far, we have described legal 
integration in the federal or transnational union as 
involving a process of ordering legal hierarchies. In part 
this process involves resolving substantive questions and 
in part procedural questions. Each of these questions, 
• however, is ultimately concerned with integrating the 
federal or transnational and state or national legal orders 
in a way that fairly balances the intere~ of legal 
uniformity and integration -- interests represented by 
the federal or transnational institutions -- against 
legitimate member state interests and prerogatives. This 
ordering of legal hierarchies does not, however, mean that 
federal or transnational law must inevitably prevail in 
any conflict with competing legal norms in the federal or 
transnational union. There is a further challenge to legal 
integration. 
l 
Legal integration proceeds, we said, from the power 
of "higher" federal or transnational law to suppress 
conflicting and "lower" state or national law. Height, 
however, is a relative concept: Law A may be higher than 
Law B but lower than Law c. And, in modern times, 
federalism and transnationalism have not been the sole 
sources of "higher" law. Another important source has been 
- 8 -
the national "bill of rights", which enumerates and seeks 
to guarantee those rights of the people that are so 
fundamental as to be invio~ by any government. The 
federal or transnational union that includes members whose 
citizens enjoy such guarantees will thus face, on the 
question of fundamental rights, a f~ther challenge to 
legal integration, for it is axiomatic that the national 
guarantees and the federal or transnational law cannot 
both be supreme within the same union. 
1 
A neatly drawn constitution or treaty establishing 
a federal or transnational union would, of course, also 
address this question. But for whatever reasons -- perhaps 
the powers granted to the federal or transnational 
legislators seem too weak ~o pose a threat to fundamental 
rights -- it may,as in the case of the European Community, 
be overlooked. When it is, it must inevitably become, as 
it has in fact become in the Community, a judicial question, 
perhaps the most difficult question of all. For it is 
not self-evident that federalism, transnationalism and 
legal integration are such worthy goals that we would be 
wise to sacrifice our fundamental rights for their cause. 
In our age of ever more intrusive governments, people need 
mre, not fewer, civil rights. At the same time, hat.lever, to carve 
out a nat.ialal. exemptial to Q'mmllli ty supremacy creates a dcct:rlne 
dangerc.us to the system in its entirety. 'lhus, the solutial to this 
fo·urth fundamental question of judicial concern in the 
federal or transnational union must seek to preserve the 
federal or transnational prerogatives not by denying 
fundamental rights, but by compensating any loss of 
.. 
- 9 -
national guarantees with the promise to protect fundamental 
rights at the federal or transnational level. This solution 
agrees, moreover, with our intuition or belief that 
fundamental rights represent one area of the law that naturally 
. S/ h+ i . favors greater integrat~on~ T _s ntuit~on is supported, 'lie 
believe, by a growing consensus among Western Nations -- as 
demonstrated by comparative constitutional research ~/ and 
manifested in such accords as the European Convention on 
Human Rights~~-- that there exists a core of fundamental 
rights that no civilized society may disrespect. 
E . No. "'Legal Transplant"' from ~..merica to· Europe 
This introduction has suggested some of the questions 
and problems requiring judicial attention in federal or 
transnational systems. It has also suggested that 
differences in legal traditions and judicial customs 
will significantly influence the judicial answers to many, 
if not all, of these questions. For, inherent though 
they may be in any federal or transnational system of 
government., these q1estions and problems require answers 
and solutions that are sensitive to different historical 
and cultural traditions. Thus, though we may expect 
many of the answers and solutions to federalism concerns 
that have been fashioned by courts in the United States 
to be suggestive of solutions to transnationalism 
-concerns in Europe , it would be na~ ve to expect the 
role of European courts in promoting legal integration 
to be a replay of the role of their American counterparts. 
European solutions must above all be sensitive to zuropean 
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traditions, traditions, moreover, which have in the 
past differed from American traditions on no question 
more perhaps than that of judicial review.~udicial 
review is, of course·, central to our topic. For, as 
this introduction has suggested, a significant judicial 
contribution to legal integration in the federal or 
transnational union in many ways presupposes judicial 
review. Any meaningful comparison and analysis of the 
judicial contribution to legal integration in the United 
States and Europe must, therefore, commence with an 
understanding of these differences, as well as of what 
~believe are their converging trends. 
. . .. . 
II. Judicial Review in· Comparative Perspective 
A. The Problem of Judicial Review 
Judicial review is a conundrum to constitutional 
democracies. To be sure, the logic of Chief Justice 
Marshall's doctrine in Marb~y v. Madison_!; -- that, 
if the Constitution is to be "higher law", judges must 
be bound to apply it over conflicting ordinary law -- is 
as forceful as it is simple.Jl/ Alexis de Toqueville 
recognized the strength of the Marbury logic when he 
wrote that the "raison d'Etat" alone, and not the "raison 
ordinaire," had led France to reject the same doctrine;~; 
Yet, especially when extended to the unavoidably vague 
value judgments inherent in much constitutional 




serious questions. Ultimately, these questions turn around 
the "mighty problem" !!_/ of the role and democratic 
legitimacy of relatively unaccountable individuals (the 
judges) and groups (the judiciary) pouring their own 
hierarchies of values or "personal predilections 11 1l. . ./ into 
the relatively~ boxes of such vague concepts as liberty, 
equality, reasonableness, fairness and due process. 
13
1 
B. The Historical Responses to the Problem of Judicial Review 
1. United States 
------)~Historically, the United States and Europe have 
responded to the problem of judicial review in quite 
different ways. In the United States, judicial review 
rather rapidly achieved an accepted -- even glorified 
aptly defined as 
place in the American system of government/checks and 
would 
balances. Today, nobody in the United States/seriously 
propose reversing MarburY v. Madison. Yet this does not 
mean that the debate in the United States over the mighty 
problem has cc::rre to an end. It is~ on the contrary, a very 
lively debate,W but.--- one that remains clearly within 
limits imposed by the requirements of a federal system of 
government. Thus, Americans argue about whether and when 
it is legitimate for the Supreme Court to invalidate a law 
on the ground that it violates some vague prohibition of 
the Bill of Rights, but no one questions the Court when 
the issue involves a conflict between 11 higher" federal law 
and "lower" state law. ~st P..nerlcans, we believe, would still 
approve what Justice Holmes said many years ago: 
.... 
,. _ I < 
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I do not think the United States would come 
to an end if we lost our power to declare an 
Act of Congress void. I do think the Onion 
would be imperiled if we could not make that 15 
declaration as tothe laws of the several States. --1 
( Judicial review per ~ is 
simply not an issue in the United States. It is too 
obviously required for the success of the American federal 
system. 
2. Europe,--------------------------------------------------~ 
--~)In the United States then, the mighty· -problem was 
early resolved in favor of judicial review, and the 
sursequent debate, heated thoagh it has often been, has 
been concerned more with the limits than with the necessity 
of the ±nsti. tution. In Europe, on the other hand, from the 
time of the French Revolution until the end of World War II 
the mighty problem was resolved largely against judicial 
review,and such appearances as it made were short-lived 
and, on the whole·;· ~successful .ti.l In part, of course, 
Europe rejected judicial review because most European 
--·-
c~~ies had strong central governments and no need for 
the institution, comparable to the need created by federalism 
in America. More fundamentally, however, Europe's 
historical rejection of judicial review may be traced to 
the mighty problem itself. For judicial review, at least 
when vague constitutional questions are involved, c:an be seen as 
111 




reJieve, than its critics claim. Thus throughout the nineteenth 
and the first half of the twentieth centuries in Europe the 
national parliaments, embodiment of the democratic will, remained 
largely Lmmune to judicial or constitutional control. :>-
~And, no especial conflict pet~een .the idea of fundamental 
energed fran this s~ tuatiOn. 
rights and the democratic ideal I Proponents of human rights 
and supporters of parliamentary supremacy were largely one and 
the same. They pursued the first goal through the means of 
democratic control and put their trust in the elected spokesmen 
for the majority. 
The history of parliamentary supremacy is, neverthel~ss, 
peculiar to each nation. In France, for example, it may 
. 
be traced to the abuse of ~~e judicial office by the 
- the higher courts of justice -
Parlements /of the Ancien R~gime, which asserted the power 
to review acts of the sovereign against "fundamental laws 
of the rea~" 18/ and arrogantly used such power to declare 
the heureuse impuissance of the legislator to introduce 
· 19 1 
even minor liberal reform. -- Largely as a result of 
such abuses and the consequent unpopularity of the judiciary, 
foremost princiPles the 
the ideology of the French Revolution proclaimed as one of lts I 
supremacy of statutory law and demoted the judiciary to 
what was conceived of as the mechanical task of applying 
20 I 
the law to individual cases.-- In England, on·the other 
hand, where the judicLal role in protecting individual 
liberties enjoyed widespread respect,~/ the tr~ph _ of 
parliamentary supremacy in the "Glorious Revolution" of 
1688 reflected not so much revulsion against the judiciary 
as affi~ation of the principle, later certified by 
Blackstone in his commentaries,22 1 of the absolute 
supremacy of Parliament-- and· its corollaries, the 
omnipotence of positive law and judicial powerlessness to 
control or review statutory law.23 1 
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What is common to these diverse national experiences, 
however, is the supreme position accorded to parliament. 
This period of parliamentary supremacy has else.-ilere been 
24 I 
called the era of "legal justice".- The ideologues of 
legal justice denied that the law is something existing 
in nature that judges find. Laws are made by man. Legal 
justice also meant that judges should be subservient to 
the law, and in order that they might not mistake what 
the law did and did not require, it was obviously 
convenient that the law be written down. In theory, 
everyone else too could then "know" the law. The era 
of legal justice · thus found its natural expression in 
the great national codifications, exemplified by the Code 
Napol~on, which tried so to occupy the legal order with 
written, or positive, law as toleave no room for what 
Jeremy Bentham, in advocating English codification, called, 
25 1 
and condemned as, "judiciary law" . -- It is true that 
the idea of legal justice was not in principle opposed 
to the written constitution. But judicial subservience 
or was believed to nean, 
to the law necessarily meant,;the impossibility of effective 
constitutional control of parliamentary power. Thus, 
while written constitutions purporting to guarantee 
fundamental rights were hardly unknown in nineteenth-
century Europe, their power was more theoretical than 
real. Italy's Statuto Albertina, for example, could 
• 
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be altered by ordinary statute , and the_French 
theoretica.uy 
Constitutions of 1799 and 1852, while/admitting the 
possibility of constitutional control of ordinary 
- largely inefiective -
legislation, gave the/power of deciding constitutional 
not to courts but '6 I 
questions/to politically controlled bodies.~ 
Later attempts as were made at implementing judicial 
review in Europe were, not surprisingly, short-lived or 
otherwise limited in their effects. The most ambitious 
of these efforts occurred in Austria and We~ar 
Germany. The Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920, 
after the Verfassungsnovelle of 1929
27 1 gave to 
certain courts the possibility of challenging before 
the newly established Constitutional Court ordinary 
statutes that violated the Constitution. In Germany 
the landmark decision of November 4, 1925 of the 
28; 
Reichsgericht-- introduced judicial review of 
legislation on the strength of Marbury's principle 
that in a hierarchical legal order courts are 
bound to prefer constitutional norms ov~r con!licting 
ordinary legislation. But both attempts to introduce 
judicial re~ew ultimately failed under the onslaught of 
fascist regimes whose ideologies included no place for 
principled restraints on government power. 
- 16 -
c. The Converging Trends and Remaining Differences 
Since World War II, many European countries have changed 
their minds about judicial review -- and, indeed, they have 
done so even about judges controlling ordinary legislation on 
the basis of vague appeals to fundamental rights, which is to 
say judicial review in its most controversial form. 
1. Reasons for the Modern Revival of Judicial Review in Europe .• 
There are, we think, two principal reasons for the revival of 
judicial review in Europe, leaving aside for the moment the 
role that the foundatia1 of the Europ!an Cc:mrnmity and transnationa J 1 sm .have 
played in this revival. First, fascism and World War II 
demonstrated the horrendous potential for tyranny, , even 
ma-jority tyranny, of governments not subject to 
constitutional res~aint. From the war's legacy of 
human tragedy and political oppression was thus revived 
the movement towards constitutionalism cut short by 
the rise of the fascist regimes. Second, the post-war 
period coincided with the grc:wt:h in the industrial 'G'7est 
of what we have come to call the welfare state, which 
has produced profound changes in the role and structure 
of government. These changes have given further impetus 
to the adoption of written constitutions -- as repositories 
of fundamental rights - and to the recognition of the 
• 
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desirability of judicial review as a check on both the 
explosion of legislation and the proliferation of 
relatively unaccountable administrative agencies -- two 
phenomena that characterize the welfare state and on which 
saxe elaboration seems appropriate here. 
The welfare state was,and is, in many 
ways an inevitable response to the problems of Western 
post-industrial societies. Among the most serious of these 
problems have been, in generic terms, "the unwanted side 
. 29 
effects of ••• production and consumption decisions,"-/ 
what economists call generally "externalities". While 
such unwanted side effects are, no doubt, present in all 
countries, no matter what the state of economic 
development, they are more complex and pressing the more 
a society is "affluent, urbanized, technologically 
advancing, economically dynamic, and chemically inventive."]Q/ 
Thus, they have been especially pressing in advanced 
Western democracies. 
Governments in the West have responded to the problem 
of external ~ts in many ways, but especially by 
intervening more and more in economic and other private 
relationships. For, the more these problems have become 
complex and pressing, the more the libertarian capitalist 
state, which limited itself to enforcing the rules of the 
economic game through contract law and a~itrust policies, 
has become obsolete. Contract and antitrust laws could 
I 
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encourage people to weigh the immediate "contractual" 
consequences of their "production and consumption 
decisions," but not these more diffuse and indirect social 
and environmental costs.tll Since those outside the 
contractual relationship -- ~-~· the general public, those 
in the neighborhood, or downstream -- 1::ear the costs, economic 
bargaining among the principals does not properly constrain 
or evaluate the process. Renee, it has become perhaps 
inevitable for governments in any economically advanced 
nation to attempt to alter these "free market" rules to 
--
require people to consider the true costs of their 
decisions. ·such attempts have ranged from specific 
legislative commands and regulations to the setting of 
priorities through short- and long-term planning, from 
guidelines and framework directives to the imposition 
of taxes and liabilities as well as to p-ressures 
through the award of indirect incentives.
32 1 All, in a 
certa.ln 
sense, have involved a derogation of/individual liberties 
vis-1-vis the government, which is not to say a lessening 
of justice, equality or even necessarily ~ overall 
l@ssening of liberty . 
Originally, these derogations were pr~arily 
legislative interventions, indeed an "orgy of statute 
making" as this phenomenon has been pointedly characterized 
by :Professor Grant Gilmore • .D" But, in time a more and 
more complex administrative apparatus , gfteR endowed with 
broad 4iscretionary and even le~i~lative powers, has been 
reauired in order to enforce, concretize, monitor and - ~-
supplement these interventions . The "welfare state," at the 
- 19 -
beginning essentially a legislative state, has thus 
become more and more an administrative, indeed a 
bureaucratic,state, with the danger of its perversion 
into a police state. 34 / This metamorphosis is the 
natural outcome of the vast, unprecedented undertaking 
of government in the welfare state. 
That these transformations are in a fundamental 
transfOJ:Inatians 
way constitutional/should be evident. They involve 
essentially a siphoning of power from the private to 
the public sector, and substantial delegation of the 
power so siphoned to administrative bodies. And, while 
such delegation of power to administrative agencies 
when undertaken by an elected legislature confers on 
the agencies a semblance of democratic legitimacy,~/ 
the size of the administrative bureaucracy in most 
modern welfare states, as well as the scope and 
complexity of the tasks \'lhich it must undertake, make 
continued parliamentary oversight theoretical at best. 3 
6 I Hence, 
~~e legitimacy con£erred is more formal than substantive. 
It must be no great surprise, therefore, that the French 
, inspired by General de Gaulle, 
Constitution of 1958/ha.s Limited the legislative jurisdiction 
of Parliament to a list of enumerated areas, while 
reserving all the rest to the legislative ("regulatory") 
power of the executive, a~ which is entirely autonarous frcm 
parliarrentaJ:y control. E./ The written Constitution has thus been made 
to reflect, perllaps with admirable frankness, constitutional reality. 
- 20 -
It is clear nevertheless that these constitutional 
transformations (speaking again not just of France) are 
potentially pathological. While parliaments may prove 
(indeed have proved) incapable of acting as omnipotent 
engineers of social progress, the emergence of the 
administrative state may bring about other, no less 
serious, problems, problems deriving substantially from 
the lack of direct electoral control of the administration. 
The dangers of bureaucratic abuses are too much a part 
of the political folklore of all Western societies to 
need specific elaboration. 
~ 
These alterations in the power structure of modern 
socie~,being themselves "constitutional," clearly have 
had constitutional implications. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the acceleration of legislative limitations 
on individual conduct has revived interest in the search 
far a core of fundamental substantive rights, a 
reservation of powers to the individual,~/ while the 
growth of the administrative state has renewed the quest 
for fundamental procedural guarantees. Such procedural 
guarantees have typically included rights to judicial 
review of administrative action, to notice and a fair 
39 
hearing, to legal counsel and against self-incr~ination.--1 
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These constitutional transformations thus 
have renewed the possibility of judicial review of 
even 
legislation /in countries previously committed to 
parliamentary supremacy.Afteralladministrative legitimacy 
to legislate is hardly better-founded than judicial 
to perfoDn such review 
legitimacy/. The problem of administrative legitimacy 
became apparent in France, for example, soon after 
promulgation of the new Constitution in 1958. So long 
as administrative decrees had been issued pursuant to 
authority delegated by Parliament, they had been considered 
as such, 
as "enabled by statute" and, they had continued to 
bear the mantle of democratic legitimacy. The enabling 
statute's supremacy vis-~-vis the judiciary had thus been 
preserved. The termination of parliamentary sponsorship, 
however, removed this protective mantle and opened the way 
(%lenents) 
to judicial review of laws/issued by a~inistrative decree 
pursuant to the powers reserved to the executive under 
the new Constitution. The Conseil d'Etat was not long 
in seeing this opening, and in 1959, in the landmark 
decision of Syndicat G~n~ral des Ing~nieurs-Conseils 40 / 
it established that executive legislation is subject to 
judicial review for conformity to the "principes g~n~raux" 
contained in, or derived from, the D~claration des droits 
- 22 -
de l'homme of 1789, the Preambles <~·!·,the bills of 
rights) of the 1946 and 1958 Constitutions,~/ and the 
(hazier yet) "Republican tradition".~ The result of 
that decision has since been confirmed and consolidated 
by a number of further pronouncements of the Conseil 
d'Etat.W 
J, 
Legislation by Parliament, however, has remained 
beyond the reach of direct review by the Conseil d'Etat, 
although the .Conseil and··· ot;he;: French courts have, perhaps, 
played a more creative role than generally acknowledged 
in conforming French statutes to fUndamental principles 
under the guise of interpretation and construction. But 
too 
parliamentary legislation;has been subject to review for 
conformity to constitutional precepts End the "principes 
. . 
q~~ since a landmark decision in 1971 by the Conseil 
Constitutionnel441 -- a new body established by the 
Constitution of 1958 and originally conceived as having 
the limdted role of preventing parliamentary interferences 
within the autonomous legislative power of the executive. 
Such review is still limited, however, to the period prior 
to pro~gation. 45/ Once promulgated, parliamentary 
legislation in France cannot be challenged for non-
conformity to the Constitution. 
Resistance against "government by the judges," so 
strong in France, has had and still has its manifestations 
elsewhere on the Continent as well. In such countries 
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constitutional guarantees must remain dependent on the 
socio-political conscience of the nation. Several 
countries, however -- indeed, a growing number of 
countries -- have lately avowed the importance of 
judicial review in the protection of the democratic 
state. Austria re-established its 1920-29 system of 
4 6 I Italy and 
constitutional adjudication in 1 945 ,- and both ;the 
Federal Republic of Germany ~ · - created Constitutional 
Courts in the aftermath of World War II.
47
/ These 
countries have openly professed to see in their 
Constitutional Courts, especially in the Courts' 
principal role of judicial review of the constitutionality 
of legislation, a pivotal tool for protecting themselves 
against the return of the evil: the horrors of 
dictatorship and the consequent trampling upon fundamental 
human rights by legislators subservient to oppress±ve 
48/ 
regimes.-- In fact, independent adjudicators such as 
those in the newly established Cor.stitutional Courts 
have been expected to act as stabilizing anchors to 
protect freedom in a turbulent age. In the view of the 
drafters of the new. Constitutions, "constitutionaJ 
justice" (Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit) has become the 
ultimate "crowning" of the Rule of Law, hence the 
foremost development of a really democratic and civil-
49/ libertarian state.--
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2. Variations Within a Converging Trend. This is not to 
suggest that the practice of judicial review is the same in 
all countries. True as it may be that the impressive spread 
of judicial review of constitutional questions represents an 
important converging trend in Western societies, the remaining 
differences are also important. Three of these differences 
especially deserve mentioning. 
ri) First, if many European countries have come to approve 
Marbury's result, few countries outside the Common Law world 
have been willing to implement to its logical end 
Marshall's rationale in that case. That rationale led 
to the conclusion that all courts confronted with a 
conflict between ordinary law and higher constitutional 
law were bound to give effect to the latter at the 
expense of the former. In most Civil Law countries, the 
conferral of such power on all courts has proved 
unacceptable, or otherwise impracticable. Thus, instead 
n 'h 
of the decentralized system of judicial review found in 
the United States and other former British colonies, 
these countries have given the pewer of constitutional 
review to a single high court, tVPicallv a specially 
created constitutional court, and have denied such 
power to all other courts. 
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The ?rincipal reasonsfor the rejection of 
decentralized control and the adoption of centralized 




I Fi 1 · d rev~ew are emse ves rst, centra ~ze 
control requires less drastic alterations in the 
doctrine, central to the Civil Law tradition, of the 
separation of powers and the supremacy of parliament. 
If such supremacy must be checked by an independent 
powe~ better that such power be exercised by a single 
court, itself more easily surveilled, than by every 
petty judge and magistrate~J_/ 
J J 
Second, the doctrine of stare decisis, which requires 
courts to follow their own precedents and/or those of 
superior courts within their jurisdiction and thus permits 
centralized control within a decentralized system, does 
not exist as such in the Civil Law tradition. Without 
such a doctrine, decentralized control risks degenerating 
into chaos. A law deemed unconstitutional by one judge 
may continue to be applied by another, or even 
resurrected by the first on other occasions. Constitutional 
rights thus may differ from chamber to chamber, day to 
. 52; 
day and litigant to litigant.-
\ J/ '-/ ... 
Third, even though a limited de facto precedential 
effect ~ derive from decisions of traditional appellate 
courts in Civil Law countries, these courts usually lack 
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the structure, procedures and mentality demanded by 
53 1 
constitutional adjudication.-- In structure, they are 
to 
too large and diffuse to insure that uniformity and/command 
that respect demanded of a constitutional adjudicator. ·m 
procedures they lack the discretionary power to limit 
their jurisdiction to the cases and issues that really 
~ usually 
matter. Appeal being/as of right, their attention and 
their voice are too easily diverted and distorted by 
trivia. And, in mentality too they often lack the 
temperament and inclination to make the hard, controversial 
choices often demanded by constitutional adjudication. In 
Civil Law countries, a career in the judiciary is often 
a car~er like . that of any public servant. The 
judge-aspirant trains in the technical application of 
statutes, graduates to a judgeship, advances by seniority 
and retires to his pension. 55/ Such a career neither 
attracts people with penumbral vision, nor trains them 
in clairvoyance. 
ll!ii) The second difference between judicial review as 
practiced today in the United States and Europe is more 
many 
surprising -- even paradoxical. For, though tnink of 
the United States as being the very "motherland" 56 1 of 
post-world War II 
judicial review, in/Europe judges have perhaps been even 
more . daring in their methods of review than t.."leir 
American brethren. To appreciate the point, ;he 
terminology adopted by Professor Thomas Grey can be of help. 
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Grey distinguishes a "purely interpretive" and a "non-
interpretive" model of judicial review. The former, 
which "has recently called forth an unusual number of 
explicit affirmations" by American writers,57 / was the 
model originally affirmed by Alexander Hamilton and 
Chief Justice Marshall and later advocated by such American 
critics of the non-interpretive model as Judge Learned 
sa; 
Hand.- It can be defined as follows: " ..• legitimate 
constitutional adjudication is limited to the application 
of concrete norms derivable from the written constitution 
itself."2..~ The non-interpretive model, on the other hand, 
is distinguished by Grey in several forms: "The purest 
form ..• , a form virtually moribund Lin the United State~/ 
today, invokes general principles of republican 
government, natural justice or human rights as confining 
legislative authority regardless of the terms or even the 
existence of a written constitution.~o; The other 
forms, which Grey calls the "surviving forms," have one 
basic feature in common: they "all claim some connection 
to the constitutional text" even though "their actual-
normative content is not derived from the language of the 
Constitution as illuminated by the intent of its framers. ,.6..1_/ 
(\\As aln:ady noted, J, t 
/the French Conseil d'Etat and Conseil Constitutionnel, 
on the other hand, when they have undertaken to control 
./ 
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the conformity of executive and parliamentary legislation 
to vague, undefined, mostly unwritten "general principles" 
and "Re.publican traditions" -- principles and traditions 
creatively "found" by the judges themselves and affirmed 
as having a higher law status -- have not only gone beyond 
a merely interpretive model of review, they have reached 
out to the "purest form" of non-interpretive review,the 
virtually 62/ 
form "ftoribund" in America today~ A similar development ~ 
characterizes the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Community, which is discussed further on.~/ 
For, this Court too has appealed to "general principles", 
principles found by the Court itself and forming what 
is seen as an emerging transnational -- and as yet 
unwritten -- Bill of Rights of the European Community. 
~(iii) The third difference between judicial review in the 
United States and Europe today is related to, is indeed 
the reverse of, the second difference. It is mentioned 
only in passing here, for it too requires fuller treatment 
64; 
at a later point.-- The difference is this. --? 
Transnationalism --or more specifically,the idea that 
European Community or transnational law should be superior 
to national law -- remains controversial in Europe, 
whereas in the United States the supremacy of federal law 
is accepted by all. And thus, judicial review in a 
quite 
transnational capacity remains/controversial in Europe, 
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whereas, as we have said, it has long been seen as a 
necessity in the United States. 
With these similarities and differences in mind then, 
we shall now consider the impact of judicial review on 
American and European legal integration. For the purposes 
of this study, the discussion of the American case will be 
brief and merely instrumental to a better understanding of 
the European case. Also, no attempt shall here be made to 
undertake a critical examination of the specific doctrines 
upon which our comparative analysis is founded. 
III. Federalism, Judicial Review and Integration in the ========== ======== ====== === ====-====== == === 
~~~~~~ ~~g~~~ 
A. Supremacy 
As noted, in any meaningful federal union the 
supremacy of federal law is an important matter. It is 
not necessarily, however, or even usually, a question for 
judicial resolution, and such has been true of supremacy 
in the United States. There, the authority of the· United 
States Congress to adopt laws of general effect in all the 
states, far from being a judge-made doctrine, was set forth 
in the aptly named supremacy clause of Article VI of the 
Constitution. 65 / Indeed, supremacy was one of the least 




1787. -- For, in the vie'fr of most of the members 
of the Convention the principal defect of the Articles of 
C6D:feCe:rat.icn then in effect was their : failure to confer 
671 
supremacy on the central government.-- Thus the very 
first vote of the Convention as a whole was the adoption 
of a resolution ,"that a national government ought to be 
established consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive 
and Judiciary." 68/ And, it followed from this decision 
that the ne~r federal government, "instead of operating on 
the States should operate without their intervention on 
691 
the individuals composing them •••• ~ The new 
government would, in other words, be a national government, 
and the citizens of the states would be citizens of the 
nation as well. 
B. Powers 
1. Implied and concurrent powers. -? ------ ~-- -:::::.5 
-7 When federal law is the supreme law of the land by 
virtue of the constitution, and states are precluded from 
brazenly ignoring federal laws they ao not like, 
constitutional disputes tend to turn to other matters. 
often 
One question they A: urn to is that of pmrer, and it is in u.s. 
the definition of federal powers that the/Supreme Court 
has made some of its most important contributions to 
integration in that country. ---? These contributions have 
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not, however, been insensitive to the often competing 
claims of the federal and state governments. On the 
one hand, the Court,beginning with its broad 
interpretation of the "necessary and proper" clause 
in McCulloch v. t1aryland 701, has contributed significantly 
to the expansion of federal powers. That case early laid 
the foundation of an 
11 
implied powers" doctrine that has 
ever since served well in protecting and expanding 
federal powers. 711 And in this century, the Court has 
opened the way to the federal government assuming nearly 
unlimited powers vis-~-vis the states through expansive 
72 1 
interpretations of the commerce clause -- and 
. 73; 
toleration of legislative delegation of power.--
These Court interpretations have both greatly expanded 
federal competence and permitted the creation of the 
administrative bureaucracy capable of exploiting the 
expanded federal powers. Thus, while we may agree with 
Sir Kenneth (now Lord) Diplock that courts could never 
?.Y 
have created the welfare state, in the United States . it 
t.OOse features of that there exist 
is doubtful whether/the welfare statelcould ever have 
been created without the cooperation of the judicial 
branch.Z.V 
1? On the other hand, 
/while the Supreme Court has been active in 
expanding federal powers, it has also been sensitive to 
/ 
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state interests. This sensitivity is best reflected, ,, 
~s, in the Court's elaboration of a concurrent 
fl 
powers doctrine, particularly as regards state regulation 
of commerce,and its relatively restrained application of 
~ ~ 
the preemption doctrine. The problem presented by the 
commerce clause is,stated simply, as follows: Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress power "To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States ••.• " Now if the commerce clause grants 
to Congress exclusive power to regulate commerce, any 
state law affecting commerce among the states would be, 
by virtue of such exclusivity, unconstitutional. If, 
on the other hand and as many once argued, the states 
retain powers coextensive to those granted to the federal 
government, then state laws affecting interstate commerce 
must be valid unless Congress has adopted a contrarylaw. 
The unconstitutionality of the state law in that case, 
however, would result from the supremacy clause, not 
from the commerce clause. 
1 1 
76 
These are, of course, the extreme positions.--/ A 
more moderate position, and one eventually taken by the 
Supreme Court in cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port 
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of Philadelphia 111, permits the states to exercise 
some control over local commerce, while recognizing 
that certain questions so fundamentally affect national 
interests as to be impennissible subjects of state 
regulation. This compromise attemp~to take into 
account the interests of the nation as a whole as well 
those 
as ;Of the separate states. It seeks to distinguish, 
in the words of Justice Jackson, "between the power of 
the State to shelter its people from menaces to their 
health and safety and from fraud, even when these 
dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack · 
of power to retard, burden or restrict the flow of such 
commerce for their economic advantage .•.. " 78/ 
2. Preemption •) 
~he doctrine of preemption also has its extreme 
in our view a distorted fOJ:ln, 
forms. In its most extreme form,/preemption is held to 
mean that all state legislation that enters into areas 
of federal competence is prohibited}~/ ~are, f~ 
competence means state incompetence, pure and simple. 
But this is not preemption at all although it bears a 
Rather, 
close resemblance to it. /fbis is the claim that federal 
powers are ipso facto exclusive powers put forth under 
another name. True preemption problems, however, arise 
not from the mere establishment of federal powers, but 
from the exercise of these powers in areas where the 
states have retained concurrent competence. Preemption 
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p:rq:erly underst:x::od 
problems/are thus problems of supremacy, but supremacy 
in a more abstracted form. 
Supremacy in its simple form means that when a 
federal law and a state law conflict, the federal rule 
prevails: federal law says drive your car in the ·right 
lane, state says drive in the left, supremacy tells us 
that right lane drivers will prevail. Preemption 
problems, of which one can distinguish two principal 
types in American jurisprudence, ~arise from more subtle 
sorts of conflicts. In one sort, a state law is 
"preempted" because it is held to conflict with general 
policy objectives of federal law. 80 1 In this type of 
preemption 
preemption 
which is really a hybrid of supremacy and 
the state retains the power to legislate 
in the field of federal concern provided that it does not 
by its legislation promote policies in conflict with 
federal policies. In the other form -- the pure form 
a state law is preempted because federal laws or federal 
concerns in the area are so comprehensive or compelling 
that they are deemed to transfor.m the federal competence 
81; 
into an exclusive power.-- The concurrent state power 




Now it is evident that the pure form of preemption 
is more of a threat to states' rights than the more 
limited "hybrid" form. It should also be evident 
that preemption analysis in this pure form \'Till often 
closely resemble commerce clause analysis. For both 
involve the sacrifice of state powers for the sake of 
federal interests. This suggests that preemption 
analysis, like commerce clause analysis, should also 
require a careful balancing of federal and state interests. 
Such, indeed, has been the direction that the U.S. Suprerce 
Court's preemption analysis has taken. 82 1 Thus, it has 
largely avoided a formalistic approach requiring federal 
preemption every time Congress passes a law regulating a 
new area of social or economic activity. And, in general, 
the Court has held in favor of preemption only when ~~~~/he 
scheme of federal regulation LI27 so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for 
the state to supplement it ···L27r the Act of Congress 
Ltouche~7 a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system LI27 assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject." 83 1 When 
the federal scheme has been less than comprehensive, or the 
federal interest not clearly dominant, the states have 
been le~t free to enact parallel legislation not openly 
conflicting .with federal law, or hindering federal policies. 84 / 
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c. Procedures 
When federal law is unarguably the 
supreme law of the land, judicial or constitu-
tional procedure, like questions of power, 
becomes another topic of hot debate. At one 
fundamental level this procedural debate 
is about whose word shall be the final word in 
constitutional disputes. At another, perhaps no 
less fundamental, level, it is about how the 
federal system ~tes the constitutional 
cla~s of its citizens. Procedural problems in 
the federal system are thus concerned with how 
to assure unifo~ity of constitutional inter-
pretation and application among the many states 
of the union, each with its own system of courts.~/ 
The framers of the Constitution sought to 
mitigate if not solve these procedural problems 
by establishing the Supreme Court and authorizing 
Congress to establish other federal courts. 
861 
jmnec'H ately 




authority to establish 
perllaps 
today /the most 
notable feature of the American judicial landscape 
is ~-------------- the parallel existence of 
federal courts, with power in certain instances 
to entertain state law questions, and state courts 
with similar powers vis-l-vis federal law. How 




The answer might I obvious enough. We would expect 
the Supreme Court to be final arbiter of federal, 
including federal constitutional, questions, and 
the respective state high courts to be supreme 
within their own jurisdictions. 
This theoretical simplicity, however, is not 
so easily established in practice. The preeminence 
of the Supreme Court in matters of federal law, 
widely accepted though it may be today, was not, 
contrary to one's expectations,assured by 
Marbury v. Madison. While Marbury established 
judicial review and the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion, it did not guarantee the supremacy of the 
Supreme Court as interpreter of the Constitution, 
and the first half of the nineteenth century 
witnessed repeated challenges to the Court's view 
of its own preeminence. Thus, in 1815 we find 
the Virginia Court of Appeals denying the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court to review its inter-
pretatio~of the federal Constitution on the 
grounds that the courts of one sovereignty cannot 
be deemed superior to those of another.~/ An 
even more extreme position, espoused by a number 
of spokesmen of the antebellum South, claimed the 
right of the states to "interpose" their own 
interpretations of the Constitution to prevent 
the enforc~ of federal constitutional inter-
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pretations, the most notorious of these efforts 
being the South Carolina nullification movement 
of 1832 and, of course, the secession of the 
Confederate states.~/ 
Although the supremacy of the Supreme Court 
as interpreter of the Constitution was eventually 
established, the search for unifor.mity has pre-
sen ted continuing challenges. For one, the ability 
of the Court to settle federal law disputes depends 
on it having juris diction to "hear • them when they 
arise, and until early in this century, appeals to 
the Supreme Court from state court proceedings 
involving federal law were allowed only wh~ the 
feeeral claim was denied by the state court. 90/ This 
regime, it is true, upheld Supreme Court supremacy, 
but the absence of appeal in cases when the 
federal claim was sustained in the state proceeding 
often prevented the Court from resolving conflicts 
in the interpretation of federal law. The goal 
of unifor.mity was thus frustrated. With the 
expansion of federal law this limitation of the 
Court's appellate jurisdiction eventually became 
untenable and in a series of reforms early in this 
century was removed by Congress.91 I 
Mere. serious problems arose, and still arise, 
from the Court's refusal to review state court 
decisions interpreting federal law that may be 
deemed also to rest on "adequate and independent 
state grounds.• 92 / This policy, founded in part 
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on the demands of judicial economy and in part 
on notions of comity that frequently affect 
federal-state judicial relations in the United 
States, obviously may operate to frustrate the 
vindication of federal rights. Particularly is 
this so when a suit raising substantial federal 
questions is dismissed for failing to comply with 
. 931 state procedural requ~rements.-- Not only are 
federal rights frustrated, but variations in 
procedure from state to state will mean that the 
ability of a citizen to vindicate federal rights 
will, to an extent, differ from state to state. 
The Supreme Court admittedly has tried to mitigate 
these problems and, thus, frequently has stated that 
any state grounds for dismissing a federal cla~ 
must be "fair" and 11 Substantial", terms not notable, 
94 I 
however, for their precision.--
Nor are all such problems el~inated by the 
availability of federal courts for the vindication 
of federal cla~s. First, there are difficulties 
of definition. For example, significant federal 
obligations may be enforced by permitting private 
individuals to bring damage actions against those 
who violate federal law. But, as is often the 
c~se, the statute creating the federal obligation 
may not expressly provide a cause of action for the 
95 1 
person who is injured by a violation of the statut~ 
If such a cause of action is _per.mitted by implication, 
does it present a federal c~aim cognizable in 
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federal courts, or does it arise merely from state 
tort law? What statute of Limitations applies? 
If the action itself is not provided for by the 
statute, it seems obvious that neither will be the 
limitation period. Theoretica-l as these questions 
may appear, it was only in 1971 that the Supreme 
Court held that the victim of an unreasonable 
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment had a cognizable federal claim. 
961 And, 
as for the applicable statute of limitations, the 
Court consistently has refused to fill these 
lacunae in the federaL law and to this day requires 
District Courts hearing suits implied under 
federal law to apply the statutes of limitations 
of the state where they sit.~/ It should be 
added, however, that to prevent inequitable results, 
the state statute may be tolled (~. the limitation 
period will not begin to run) so long as the 
~jured party has not discovered, and could not 
reasonably have discovered, the violation of rights 




The Supreme · Court's solutions to these 
problems, like its solutions to commerce clause 
and preemption problems, may thus be seen to 
- en the whole, a very healthy one -
involve a compromise/between the demands of 
uniformity and diversity in tile federal system. 
Similar compromises recur frequently in the 
Court's jurisprudence; they rep resent, it is 
clear' an important theme in the history of 
99; 
American legal integration.--
o. Fund amen tal Rights 
Fundamental rights, we said, present two 
basic problems ~ a federal union. On the one 
hand, there is the problem of conflicts between 
federal law and state guarantees of fundamental 
rights. On the other, there is the question of 
whether federal guarantees shall be applied to 
state legislation. The first <C!!~:----: has been 
no problem ~ the United States because the 
supremacy clause of the Constitution states that 
federal law shall be supreme, qany Thing in the 
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constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding."~9' The question of the applica-
bility of the federal Bill of Rights to state law 
on the aJn17'arY, 
has, - I been one of the Supreme Court's 
continuing concerns. It has been on this question, 
~oreover, that the Court has made perhaps its most 
profound contribution to legal integration in the 
United States, although a contribution arrived at 
at a comparatively late date. 
There are essentially two ways of viewing a 
federal bill of rights. One way sees the bill 
of rights as imposing limits only on the federal 
government -- the government, that is, established 
by the constitu~ of which the bill of rights 
forms a part. The other way sees the constitution 
/ 
and the bill of rights with it/ forming the supreme 
law of the land and thus limiting state as well as 
federal governments. The first ten amendments, 
adopted in 1791 and forming the original federal 
in the United States 
Bill of Right~, do not on the--whole say which 
~ . 
is the correct way for them to be viewed. With 
the exception of the First and Seventh Amendments, 
these amendments do not state that they are 
101 1 addressed only to the federal government.-- More-
over, the supremacy clause does state that the 
Constitution (as well as federal law generally) enjoys 
supremacy as against the states . Nevertheless, 
in an early Marshall opinion the Supreme Court 
chose the former view, holding that the Bill of 
Rights limits only the powers of the federal 
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1~ 
government. Under this decision, the states 
were left free to protect or disregard such rights 
as they pleased, subject to a few exceptions,such 
as the prohibitions of bills of attainder and ex post 
facto laws, which expressly applied to them as well 
as to the federal governrnent.
1031 Slavery is only 
the most vivid example in American history of 
unequal protection among the states, and it, of 
course, proved to be a problem that neither the 
courts (if they had wished) nor Congress could 
resolve. 
of ~ f~ Bill of Rights 
This more l~ited view/might have prevailed 
even until today but for the adoption of the 
so-called Civil War amendments. For, these amend-
ments specifically prohibit state infringement of 
certain individual rights, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in particular couches these prohibitions in 
very vague and general terms. It speaks against 
deprivations of "life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law" and against denials 
10~ 
of ''the equal protection of the laws !'-7 Called 
upon to give meaning to these vague and elusive 
terms, the Supreme Court in the last one hundred-
odd years has gradually interpreted them to embrace 
an ever-expanding core of the restrictions contained 
in the original Bill of Rights;os; Its earlier 
decision assi~~ing a relatively l~ited role to 
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the Bill of Rights has thus been reversed in fact, 
if never explicitly overruled. Needless to say, 
the integrational impact of this development has 
been tremendous and its potential is far from 
being exhausted. 
IV.. Transnationalism, J-udicial Review and Integration 
In Eurog=- ~ Ligilt ~ ~ Alrerican Exterience 
Europe~~tegration in our time begins in 
a serious way with the foundation of the European 
Community. The Community, of course, differs in 
many and profound ways from the United States. 
Its.members are subjects of international law, 
and c:uJ:mncies 
have their own foreign policies/and are ultimately 
106; 
responsible for the defense of their citizens.--
Its nlegislativen institutions and processes are 
very different. Its most important policy-making 
institution, the Council, is more a diplomatic 
. 107 
round-table than a true Community institution.--/ 
Although in theory it can act on many issues by 
qualified or simple majority vote, in practice, 
usually 
its decisionsl.are adopted unanimously and con-
often 
sequently~eflect the lowest common denominator 
108/ among the positions of the Member States.-- The 
Community further has no strong executive branch. 
Its pol~cies and rules for the most part depend on 
. 109; 
national authorities for their enforcement.--
The European Community is thus a much .looser organi-
zation of states than the United States. In 
many ways, indeed, it resembles the organization 
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of the original thirteen American states under 
the Articles of Confederation;~; But, in two 
Lmportant ways it differs from that short-lived 
confederation: it has a court and it has the 
power to adopt rules having direct effect on the 
citizens of the Member States;~; These two 
differences help explain in a not insignificant 
way,we think, the Community's comparative success 
- as well-as. ·.the-g:z:ea:t txrt:enti9-l it retains-
and the considerable progress it has made/ in 
legal integration. For the Court of Justice esta-
blished by the Community has contributed greatly to 
EUropean integration and it has been able to do 
so in large part because Community law operates 
directly on the citizens of the Member States. 
q Let us consider then the Court's contribution. 
l A. Supremacy 
1 • The. "Cons·titutionalization" of the Treaties. -:::> 
~ There are perhaps no more profound differences 
between the European Community and the United 
States than the related facts that the Community 
was founded on the basis of international Treaties, 
and that these Treaties failed to declare clearly 
whether Community law would enjoy supremacy among 
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the Member States. Thus a crucial initial task facing 
the Community's Court of Justice has required the 
"constitutionalization" of the Treaties, a process 
implying both the elevation of the Treaties to "higher 
law" status and their interpretation by techniques more 
112 
appropriate to constitutions than to multipartite treaties-.-' 
J. j( 
Both aspects of the process have been manifest in 
the Court's elaboration of the doctrine of direct effect 
and unflagging insistence, since its famous decision in 
113 I 
1964 in Costa v. ~,-- that Community law, both 
primary and secondary, is preeminent vis-a-vis both prior 
and subsequent national law (including even national 
constitutional law)}
14
1 The doctrine of direct effect, 
first announced in 1963 and since much elaborated, 
has come to mean that the provisions of the Treaties 
115
1 
~stablishing the Community, as well as secondary Community 
legislation, bestow enforceable rights and obligations not 
116 I 
just on the Member States, but also on their citizens. --
- ----
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The enforcement of Community law thus does not wholly 
depend on the cooperation of ·the governments of the Member 
States. Citizens with Community-created rights can 
themselves directly enforce those rights in judicial 
proceedings, but, it should be noted, in proceedings 
brought in their own national courts. For, unlike ~~e 
Onited States, the Community itself has no system of 
lower courts with "original" jurisdiction to hear cases 
' 117 
raising issues of Community law. --1 The effectiveness 
of the Court of Justice in enforcing its vision of 
Community supremacy, and of Community law generally, 
must depend, therefore, on the cooperation of national 
courts. 
2. The Case of France. 
---) Direct effect and supremacy present very difficult 
questions for national courts, threatening as they do 
the traditional supremacy of national parliaments and 
cherished concepts of national sovereignty. Nowhere, 
understandably, has the delicacy of these issues been more 
evident than in France where they have had quite different 
receptions from different courts. On the one hand the 
Conseil d'Etat has refused to control French administrative 
118; 
law with Community law,-- while on the other the Cour de 
Cassation in the case of hJm:inistration des rcruanes v. Societe cafes 
Jacque~ab~e .~has_}lph~~d=~Cg~unity. ~up~~a~- .in ·-~=-
declini~g- to give application to French legislation in 
conflict with the Community Treaties. 
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JLgne theory argued in both cases (and apparently accepted 
by the Conseil d'Etat) was that judicial non-application 
of French legislation because of its conflict with 
international treaty law (in particular, with the Treaties 
establishing the European Community) would be tantamount 
to judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. 
It would in fact -- so the ~rgument went -- involve the 
control of a possible Parliamentary violation of Art. 55 
of the Constitution, which establishes that "the treaties 
or LlnternationalJ accord~ regularly ratified or approved 
have, from their publication, an authority sup'erior to that 
of the laws, upon reservation, for each accord or treaty, 
of its application by the other party." 
To be sure, 1 ~ 
/~ specter of gouvernement des juges -
was averted by the Cour de Cassation, which, while 
deciding that courts are indeed bound not to give 
application to French legislation if it is in conflict 
with international treaty law in general, and with 
Community law in particular, took care to proclaim 
through its Procureur Gen~ral that this is not a form 
of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation; 
it is mere interpretation-- the judges' typical 
function. It is, so the argument continued, the 
natural role of the judge to apply a law having a 
"higher authority," rather than a conflicting lower 
law; and Community law -- or, more generally, international 
treaty law -- is higher law, without being constitutional 
hoiever, 
law •
120 I It is enough to formulate such an argumen"t1/to 
/ 
see the plain, albeit so painstakingly denied, analogy --
·to the Matbury doctrine.1211 Chief Justice Marshall, _;t?Q_, 
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no less than the French Court, tried to minimize if 
not hide -- judicial review by reducing it to terms of 
12 5-' 
mere interpretation.--
Needless to say, the implication~ of ~~is 
reason~IJ.q by the French -Court, were it to prevail, are 
~l 
extremely far-reaching. To be sure, the holding is 
concerned with international treaty law, but ~~is 
term, in the light of the authoritative submissions 
by the Procureur G~n~ral, certainly extends to Community 
law generally. This means that the Court's holding 
is not limited to "primary" Community law (the Treaties, 
including the very broad European Economic Community 
Treaty) but also includes that large and rapidly 
expanding body of "secondary" Community law, ~vhich is 
enacted by Community organs and which, by virtue of 
havinJ 
Art. 1 a 9 EEC Treaty and other Treaty provisions I is capable of/ 
applicability and direct 12 4; 
direct/effect in all the Member States.--
3. ~The Community S'ystem of Judicial Review. As the 
Caf~s Jacques Vabre case illustrates, the supremacy 
doctrine, coupled with the ~rine of direct effect, 
brings about a Community system of judicial review. 
new 
All the many thousands of national judges in thej~en 
Member States are entitled, and indeed obliged, to 
control the conformity of national legislation to 
-----:- --~- -~. ':"':. ~---
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~ty law and to deny application to the former 
whenever it is found violative of the "higher" Community 
law applicable in the case at hand;
251 This trans-
national review system, in which Community law assumes 
a role analogous to federal law vis-A-vis ~tate law 
in the United States, or to confederal law vis-~-vis 
cantonal law in Switzerland, is strengthened by t.l,e 
possibility and, in some cases, by the obligation of 
the national courts to turn to the European Court of 
Justice at Luxembourg for a binding ruling concerning 
the interpretation or validity of the relevant Community 
provisions. 
12r And, not unlike a holding of the u.s. 
Supreme Court, such a ruling has precedential effect 
-- thus representing a powerful instrument for the 
uniform interpretation of Community law throughout the 
127 
ten Member States.-/ 
4. -. Acceptance of the s·upremacy Doctrine and the Case of 
I 
;/1.4 Urtited KirtgdC!n. The supremacy doctrine, despite the_ resistance of 
~ 
.. -- · .. ) the Conseil d'Etat, has been accepted by (at least) all 
of the other original members: Germany, Italy and the 
Benelux countries.1281 And, it can have been no surprise 
to the four newer Member States of the Community --
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Greece -- since 
the doctrine was already longstanding at the time of 
129; 
their accession.- Supremacy should prove to represent 
no serious problem for the latter three countries, 
in which, unlike in the United Kingdom, there is a 
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tradition recognizing both a hierarchy of norms and 
the power of the Irish, Danish and Greek courts, or 
some of them, to control th~ conformity of lower to 
higher laws;
3o; Bu~ the problem , not yet resolved 
by high court decisions, is very serious and hotly 
131 
debated in the first of the four newer members.--/ 
England's most basic constitutional principle -- its 
"Grundnorm" 
132
1 -- has long been the unlimited 
supremacy of Parliament, the corollary of which is 
the most rigid refusal of any judicial power to 
control Parliamentary legislation. To be sure, the 
133; 
European Communities Act 1972,-- which marked the 
United Kingdom's accession to the European Community, 
affirms that country's willingness to accept the 
principle of the direct applicability of Community 
law (Section 2 (1)) and, more generally, to make 
its own the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice (which, of course, includes the supremacy 
doctrine) (Section 3). Also, the Act seems to make 
some verbal effort to bind even future English 
legislators to comply with Community law (Section 2 (4)). 
Yet, if the British Grundnorm is not abandoned, no 
present Parliament will be able to restrict the will 
of any future Parliament -- which is manifestly a 
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principle incompatible with the central idea of 
federalism and transnationalism, i.e., the inability 
of state law to supersede validly enacted federal or 
transnational law. To be sur~ 
C::: final result of this "great debate" in the 
United Kingdom will depend,we suppose, not so much on . 
134; 
legal as on political developments.-- If, on the one 
hand, the United Kingdom eventually accepts the ~ 
doctrine, by that very fact a novel form of judicial 
review will have been adopted by a nation which, even 
more rigorously than France, has purported to reject 
all forms of judicial review since, at least, its 
"Glorious Revolution" of 1688. On the other hand, a 
refusal of that country to confirm the supremacy 
doctrine would jeopardize the country's very participation 
in the Community. 
~he acceptance of Community supremacy is, of 
course, an essential step in the process of legal 
integration. To the extent, however, that acceptance 
is based on the law of international treaties,unfortunate 
implications may follow. Most serious ----~ is the 
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possibility that changes in municipal doctrine 
the e£fect of 
regarding/international treaties could unilaterally 
reopen the question of Community supremacy. Of 
course, one can ab~ that withdrawal is similarly 
available to the member that finds Community supremacy 
distasteful, but that avenue at least will thenceforth 
deny the benefits of membership to the seceding nation. 
Thus it has built-in anti-secessionist incentives. 
B. Powers 
1 • Expansion by the Court of Justice.--------;> 
----~)This is not the place to compare and contrast the 
legislative powers conferred by the Treaties of the 
European Community on the institutions of the 
Community with those possessed by the American Congress 
although, of course, the extent of such powers must 
ultimately determine the breadth of possible legal 
integration. Suffice it to say that the powers granted 
to the Community to establish a common market are not 
on their face less expansive ~~an the American commerce 
clause. True, those powers reflect their free-trade 
ideology more clearly perhaps than the commerce clause. 
They are more programmatic in that regard and thus may 
imply restrictions on the type of action that the 
.I 
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Community, as well as the Member States, may take 
135 I 
in regulating commerce.~ But that is the view 
of today, and, as with the commerce clause, only 
nistory and judicial interpretation will tell the 
true scope of the Community's powers. 
\ J '\.'/ ...... 
The Court of Justice has already, however, 
taken significant steps in expanding Community powers 
through its development of an i~lied powers doctrine 
and in its preemption analysis. Its jurisprudence 
in these areas, it is true, is not without its 
inconsistencies and false starts arising in part, no 
I 
doubt, from the ~ generis nature of the Treaties, 
which are neither wholly treaties nor wholly 
constitution.~r As the Court's vision of the 
Treaties as constitution comes more clearly into 
focus, however, these problems may be expected to 
recede. 
2. Implied Powers. The implied powers doctrine w~s_ gi v:~~ __ _ 
its classic formulation,again,by Chief Justice Marshall: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the consti~ution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.1~/ 
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The difficulty with the Community adopting this 
formulation is that treaties, unlike constitutions, 
are concerned more with problems than r.-ri th powers. 
~fuile they may create international institutions to 
solve specific problems, ana grant limited powers 
thereto, such powers are not infrequently inadequate 
to solve the problems addressed. In the~e instances, 
rarely are the purposes of the organization then 
allowed to define and expand the powers granted to it 
by the treaty. A carefully drafted treat~ will, 
therefore, contain procedures for expanding, if 
necessary, institutional powers to address unforeseen 
problems. The "small treaty revision" procedure 
contained in the Community Treaties is an example.13 ~ 
A~tthis doctrinal background, it is not 
surprising that the Court of Justice has vacillated 
over the question of implied powers. On the one hand, 
in the ERTA case it read Article 210 of the EEC Treaty, 
providing that "~he Communi~y shall have legal 
personalit~_ ~i;Q~ mean ~~-t th~_ GOIDI!l~i~y- ~~~j~i_~r~.;ty­
making powers equal in subs~~tive s~_c?pe to its internal 
- - .. 
le:Jislati~e _ po~~~s de.spite the __ ~~c.t that sp~ci_fic 
provisions of the Treaty had -given the community ~nly 
I at 
limited treaty-making powers.~ On the other hand, it has/ 
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times read the Treaties very narrowly, for example, 
Treaty 
denying that ECSC/Article 70, paragraph 3, which 
requires that "the scales, rates and all other tariff .ruleE 
of every k:in:i~applied to the carriage ~of coal and 
each l-Em1:er State 
steel within/and between Member States shall be 
published or brought to the knowledge of the High 
Authority," endowed the High Authority with executive 
power to require trucking tariffs to be published or 
otherwise communicated to it.!!~ 
\ v 
Troubling as these il'l:ea"~sistencies may appear, 
however, at this stage of the Community's development, 
implied powers are ~~undarnentally a judicial problem. 
Implied powers tend to be executive powersi they are 





/ A t i li d d t . th s rang mp e powers oc r~ne en 
ensureexecutive flexibility. But in the Community, 
executive weakness is more than anything a 
constitutional problem. For the most part, the 
Community does not execute its own policies; the 
142/ 
Member States do. The Community's executive weakness 
prc:i?ably 




----~)Preemption presents a somewhat different story, 
although one also related to the nature of the Treaties. 
Preemption,it should be recalled,means different 
things, but one thing it always means in a federal or 
transnational system is the sacrifice of state or 
national prerogatives to overriding federal or 
transnational interests. These overriding interests 
may be present in the constitution itself (in which 
case preemption is not involved at all in a strict 
sense) or they may be reflected in federal or 
transnational legislation. Now most federal constitutions 
do not express interests in so many words. They 
143 
establish a form of government and distribute powers.--/ 
They leave the expression of interests to the political 
proce~s and to the future. In such a system, as in 
the United States, one presumes that the constitutional 
enumeration of powers oelonging to the federal 
_ not 
government does/prevent the states from exercising 
the same powers 
14 f so long as they do not use ~~ese 
powers in contravention of a specific federal la'-1 or 
policy. 
The Community Treaties, however, differ from a 
inter alia, 
pure constitutional documen~/in that they contain 
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programmatic commands for "common" policies and 
harmonization.~~ These commands naturally call into 
question the presumption in favor of concurrent powers. 
For, might not one say that where common policies are 
a constitutional goal, local policies are ipso facto 
unconstitutional? The programmatic nature of the 
Treaties t."'lus has supported a "preemption" analysis 
proceeding from teleological premises quite opposed 
to one of the fundamental premises of American 
federalism: the interstitial nature of federal law 
even in the areas of federal competence. 
1~; 
J l 
The effect of these premises, moreover, has been 
to transform the preemption doctrine, at least in the 
early jurispruderice of the Court of Justice, from a 
method of balancing transnational and national interests 
into a weapon for restricting natioruU powers. Thus, 
in the early jurisprudence, wherever the Community 
planted its flag, it was declared by the Court to have 
147 L . 
occupied the field.-'BUt,jf it is indeed true that the 
Community's political processes result in much of its 
policies reflecting the lowest common denominator of 
positions ~q· the Member States, then the danger of 
this approach should be obvious. Subsequently, hOtJeVer, 
dogmatic and 
the Court has begun to take a less/formalistic, more 
/ / 
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pragmatic approach to preemption questions, an 
approach, it must be said, more fully consistent with 
the constitutionalization of the Treaties, although 
obviously less integrationalist in effect. Onder this 
approach, which of course bears greater resemblance 
to that in the United States, the Court has been more 
willing to let stand national legislation in areas of 
community power and concern. It should be noted, 
however, that the court's later jurisprudence has not .. . 
148/ 
been entirely free of formalistic retreats.--
c. Procedures 
Despite the many difficulties of constitutionalizing 
the Community Treaties, it is clear that the Court of 
Justice has already made profound substantive 
contributio~to European legal integration:in declaring 
the supremacy of Community law, in conferring Community 
legal rights on the individua~ and more generally in 
defining, in a more or less expansive manner, Community 
legislative powers~ We must now ask whether the 
Community has developed the procedures to make 
Community law, supreme in principle, uniformly applicable 
and available throughout the Member States. In 
answering this question we will see reappear many of 
the issues that have arisen in the United States from 
the tensions between competing federal and state court 
. issues 
systems. Most important of these ;1s, again, the access-
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to-justice question : to what extent will local 
proceduresbe permitted to affect Community rights? 
1 . r:ecentralized Ccmnuni ty Review and the "Preliminary Ruling" Pro-
~.The Community,as we have noted, has adopted a 
method of decentralized control of Community validity: 
every judge (from the lowest' j~ge concili~teur to the _ ~ghe.s­
constitutional court) in each of the ten states is 
given the power to question the Community validity of 
national laws. Since the judges of one national legal 
system are not bound to follow precedents from other 
national legal systems, it is clear that the potential 
for national divergence and contradiction in 
interpretat-ion is immense. If we add to this the fact 
that several of the ten member states also have blO 
or more separate court systems, each with a superior 
1491 
(in practice supreme) court at its head
1
-- we see 
that there is a great possibility of conflict even 
within a single national system. And if finally we 
remember that eight of the systems are Civil Law 
systems, with no formal doctrine of stare decisis, 
then it would seem that such a decentralized system 
of control is doomed to chaos and,ultimately,to failure. 
l t 
The Community has, however, more or less 
successfully solved these primary problems of 
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decentralized control by adopting a "preliminary 
ruling" procedure. The Treaties provide that any 
judge who in a case before him is faced with a 
question of Community law may, and in certain cases 
must, refer the question to the European Court for 
a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the 
C · t i . 
150/ Th h thi t ommun~ y prov s~on.-- roug s sys em, 
"Community review," although generally decentralized, 
is nevertheless subject to a centralized control 
which effectively corrects the shortcomings of the 
decentralized system. More importantly in light 
of the American federal experience,the Court, 
according to the Treaties, is the final authoritative 
interpreter of Community law,
151
/ and according to 
the Court ''s own jurisprudence I its decisions (as 
part of "Community law") not only have ~tial 
value within the Member states, but are also 
superior in effect to any national law -- including 
152 
the decisions of national courts.--/ It is clear, 
therefore, that any interpretation given by the Court 
in any case is an extremely persuasive -- even a 
binding -- authority on any national court. It is 
this central position of aub~ority which allows the 
measure of success enjoyed by this system of 
decentralized judicial control. 
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2. Possibilities for Manipulation.------::> 
--~?The supremacy of the Court of Justice in the 
interpretation of Community law would thus seem to 
be assured. In practice, however, as in the United 
States where state courts can to an extent prevent 
Supreme Court review of their interpretations of 
federal law by interposing independent state law 
grounds for their decisions, uncooperative national 
courts, even those of last instance, can manipulate 
the Community's system of judicial revie\v. This 
!'Y"'!C:Sibili tv . . f h 1 f l:'"'":':::; .:~:_ ;: _ a:'r~ ses ~n part rom t e _anguage o EEC 
Article 177, and in part from the Court of Justi ce's 
own jurisprudence. Article 177, which is the basis 
of the Court's preliminary ruling jurisdiction, 
cases raising 
·limits such juris diction toj"questions" of 
'interpretation". And the Court, in stressing the 
pre~tial effect of its decisions, has held that 
even nationa l courts of last instance, which by the 
terms of Article 177 are required to refer questions 
of Community law to the Court, need not do so if the 
issue to be addressed has already been decided in a 
prior decision of the Court}
53
/ Thus, taken together, 
Article 177 and the Court's jurisprudence suggest 
that dubiousness is a jurisdictional criterion -- that 
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is, there must be some doubt as to the proper 
interpretation of the Community law in question 
154 
before a referral is required.--/ 
The introduction of such a concept into 
Community law, particularly when application of the 
law requires the cooperation of different legal 
system~ has its obvious dangers. These dangers have 
emerged, for example, in the application by some 
national courts of the "acte clair" doctrine, which 
in French law determines when a question of law must 
be referred by the civil to the administrative courts!55 / 
Under that doctrine, referral is required only if 
the issue raises "une difficult~ r~elle •.• de nature 
~ faire na!tre un doute dans un esprit e~laire. "156/ 
The doctrine is clearly capable of abuse,and, in fact, 
has been relied upon by the French Conseil d'Etat 
in refusing to refer questions of Community law to 
the Court of Justice in situations where other 
national courts, faced with similar issues, have been less 
self-assured.157/ 
3. Procedural Barriers to Access .------7 
---7A second problem, which was also met in the 
American context, is that of procedural barriers to 
15~ 
the vindication of substantive Community rights.--
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Li\ In the United States, of course, the problems of 
state procedural barriers are somewhat overcome by 
the existence of lower federal courts, with broad 
jurisdiction to decide federal questions, as well as 
by the Supreme Court's development of doctrines 
designed to balance the competing claims of state 
. 159 1 
procedural purity and federal r~ghts.-- The 
Community, on the other hand, has no system of 
independent lower courts. Thus, one might expect 
the Court of Justice to have been even mo r e sensitive 
than its American counterpart to the inevitable 
tensions between procedure and substance. Instead, 
it has so far declined to encroach on national 
procedural prerogatives. It has, however , begun to 
develop principles that may permit it to do so in 
the future . Thus , for example, it has declared that 
national procedures that cut off Community rights 
or unduly restrict 
must be "reasonable," must not totally preclude/ the 
defense of such rights, and must not discriminate 
160/(/ 
agains t claimants of Community rights .--'Jtrhe Court's 
~~-------deference to national procedure at the 
expense of Community uniformity may, of course, result 
from a shreTt~d political judgment. Under the judicial 
system established by the Community, national courts 
are indispensable to the enforcement of the Court's 
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refer issu:s to the COurt and 
jurisprudence. Only they can/apply and enforce the 
Court's judgments in the crucial Article 177 cases. 
Sensitivity to its own weakness thus may have 
convinced the Court to avoid a direct confrontation 
with the national courts. 
D. Fundamental Rights 
Fundamental rights are one subject over whic~ 
a direct confrontation between the Court of Justice 
to avoid •. 
and at least one national court has proved impossible/ 
For, unlike the o.s. Constitution, the Treaties 
creating the Community fail to resolve the status of 
Community law vis-~-vis national constitutional law. 
The Treaties, moreover, do not themselves include 
a bill . of rights. Fundamental rights have thus 
become one of the greatest challenges to the Court, 
as well as one of its greatest opportunities -- an 
opportunity because the Court has perceived,rightly 
we think, that the only way realistically to insure 
the Member States' adherence to Community supremacy 
even as against their own constitutional guarantees 
is for itself to guarantee Community respect for 
fundamental rights. The judicial resolution of this 
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conflict between Community law and national guarantees 
may thus contain the seeds of the Comrnunity "Bill of 
Rights" the fathers of the Community did not consider 
. 1 d. . h . 161 I necessary to 1nc u e 1n t e Treat1es.-- we will return 
to this point after discussing another and more 
L-/ immediate transnational source of human rights. ----
~ 1. The European Convention of Human Rights.------, 
---~This more immediate source, one that affects 
not just the 11 Little Europe" of the Ten, but also the 
larger Europe of the (by now) twenty-one members of 
--:- all the countries of \"iestern EUrOJ;e except Finland .,.....,.. 
the Council of Europe; is the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.1621 
Unlike Community law, no doctrine of direct effect 
and supremacy has been developed by the Convention ' s 
transnational adjudicators. Hence, every member. state 
applies its own general approach as to the effects 
of international treaty law within its own national 
system. As a consequence, the effects of the 
Convention16~ range from a ma~imum in Austria, where 
international treaty law is recognized to have the 
.. 
same force as national constitutional law, to a 
minimum in such countries as the United Kingdom and 
the Scandinavian nations. In these latter countries 
the Convention is not recognized to have direct 
effect, and therefore it cannot as such be 
invoked as binding law in the national courts. An 
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intermediate position is occupied by countries such 
as Belgium and (if the reasoning of the Cour de Cassation 
in Cafes Jacques Vabre, based as it is on the law of 
international treaties, prevails) France, where inter-
national treaty law and, therefore, the Convention 
itself are attributed . a ~ force superior to ordinary 
national legislation, without being attributed 
constitutional status. Also occupying an intermediate 
position are Germany and Italy where, apparently, 
the Convention has direct effect but with a 
status equal to ordinary national law, and thus 
susceptible to being superseded by subsequent 
1641' 
national law. _r 
Convention 
Because the effects of the depend on 
national law, its power to promote harmonization of 
fundamental rights is obviously somewhat limited. 
Nonetheless, it is not un~portant. For, unlike other 
documents such as ~~e United Nations' Declaration of 
165; 
Human Rights of 1948,- the E\lropean Convention is 
accompanied by ~portant machinery for its enforcement, 
including the Commission and the Court of Human Rights 
166; 
sitting at Strasbourg.-- Perhaps the most innovative 
feature, however, is the woptional clause" of art. 25 
of the Convention, whereby signatories may accept a 
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dramatic enlargement of standing to file a complaint 
with the Commission (and possibly, through the 
167 
Commission, eventually to the Court) of Human Rights.--/ 
Fifteen of the member states have so far 
adopted the clause: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, · Ireland, Italy, 
Spain, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Non.ray, Portugal/ Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom 168/ -- and France, 
under the presidency of Mi~rand is now expected to 
follow suit. Thus, these fL.~T'l. states have alla..'ed. t.i-leir ONn 
nationals - about two hundred and eighty million Europeans 
169
/-
to attack before the Co~~ission any violation of the 
Convention by any sort of state action, whether 
legislative, administrative, o'r even judicial, after 
exhaustion of effective domestic remedies. To be 
sure, the decisions taken by the transnational 
adjudicators at Strasbourg are not automatically 
enforceable in the member states, unlike decisions 
of the European Community's Court of Justice at 
170; 
Luxembourg.-- Compliance, however, does represent 
an international law duty for the member states and, 
as a matter of fact, decisions have so far been 
complied wi~~' even in cases where they have required 
dramatic legislative changes. 17V 
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2 . Community Law and the Is sue of Human Rights . --~ 
----)The greater potential for the development of a 
jurisprudence of fundamental rights still remains, hcwever, 
European CCmmJn.i ty IS 
with the/court of Justice, desoite the omission of a 
"bill of rights" from the Treaties of the European 
Community. ~Surely this omission is not surprising 
if we recall that, in arguing for the ratification of 
the United States Constitution notwithstanding the 
absence at that time of a bill of rights, Alexander 
Hamilton said in the Federalist that the limited 
powers of the federal government made such a bill 
172; 
unnecessary.-- This view was shared by James Madison 
who, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, explained in 
1788 that a bill of rights was unimportant because 
"the limited powers of the federal Government and 
the jealousy of the subordinate Governments, afford 
a security which had not existed in the case of 
173; 
State Governments."-- Presumably, the framers of 
also believed 
the Ccmm.Jnity Treaties I that the scope of Community law 
was essentially limited to economic integration 
problems and that human rights issues would hardly 
be involved. 
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The legislative appetite of the modern welfare 
state, however, has disproved this belief. Due to its 
rapid expansion into many areas of modern social as 
well as economic life, Coro~unity law has become 
increasingly involved with crucial issues ranging 
from property and labor rights to nationality and 
174; 
sex dis.crimination .- Thus, a problem which in the 
fifties might have appeared to be merely an abstract 
hypothetical of little practical significance has 
become one of the hottest issues of both 
constitutional and Community law in the Europe of 
the seventies and eighties. In May 1974 the debate 
took the character, and revealed the dangers, of 
an acute conflict of international dimensions. In the 
clamorous . Internationale Handelsgesellschaft decision 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, over the strong dissent 
of three of its Justices, affirmed the inapplicability 
in Germany of Community law -- at least, of secondary 
Community law -- if this law is found to be in conflict 
with the fundamental human rights provisiornof the 
1751 Grundgesetz.-- Thus did the crisis of the Treaties' 
failure to definitively declare Community supremacy 
come to a critical impasse. 
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This decision aroused a prompt and vigorous 
protest against Germany by the Commission of the 
176; 
European Community.-- The Commission made it clear 
that the German Constitutional Court's decision was 
a challenge to the unity of Community law which, 
by its very nature, must be uniformly and 
simultaneously applied throughout the entire Community. 
But the most important and elaborate reaction to 
177; 
the dangerous, although allegedly only provisional,--
"secession" of the German Constitutional Court has 
come from the Community's Court of Justice. Indeed, 
the Court had not even waited for the German 
dec-ision to take a firm, clear, and -- so it seems 
to us at least -- perfectly reasonable position on the 
issue at stake. Already in 1969, in Stauder v. 
178; 
City of Ulm -- the Court had stated that Community 
law must not "jeopardize the fundamental rights of 
the individual contained in the general principles 
of the law of the Community." This far-reaching 
statement was further developed in later cases, 
especially in Nold v. Commission, 
1~/ a decisjon 
taken just a few days before the German Constitutional 
Court's decision. In Nold the European Court of 
Justice said, inter ~: 
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As this Court has already held, fundamental 
rights form an integral part of the general 
principles of law which it enforces. In 
assuring the protection of such rights, this 
Court is required to base itself on the 
constitutional traditions common to the 
member-states and therefore could not allow 
measures which are incompatible with ~~e 
fundamental rights recognised and guaranteed 
by the constitutions of such States. The 
international treaties on the protection of 
human rights in which the member-States have 
co-operated or to which they have adhered 
can also supply indications which may be 
taken into account Hithin the framework of 
Community law. It is in the light of these 
principles that the plaints raised by the 
applicant should be assessed.1~; 
Thus the Court of Justice, while on the one hand 
accepting a conception whereby Community law, although 
superior to all national laws, is itself bound to 
respect a higher law, especially in the area of 
human rights, on the other hand affirmed the 
transnational character of such higher law. In the 
Court's doctrine, in fact,this higher law is not 
identifiable with any single ~ember s:ate's 
Constitution or constitutional tradition; rather, it 
181 1 
is itself (unwritten) Community law.-- And, it is 
the role of the European Court of Justice -- not of 
any national court -- to give the final word in 
"finding" such a higher Community law, even though the 
Court's finding must be based on the constitutional 
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traditions (not of ~' but) of all the Member States, 
as well as on such international treaties as the 
European Convention on Human Rights to which all the 
Ten have adhered.
1821 
3. Integrational Effect of the (Unwritten) Ccmmmity Bill of 
Rights-To be sure, it is not self-evident that the 
developing doctrine of fundamental Community rights will 
have a direct effect on member state legislation. To 
183 
extend the view of John Marshall, __ / a Community bill 
of rights would limit only Community 
(as well as other national state action) 
action, 
national legislation/would be subject only to such 
while 
rights as were guaranteed in the constitutions of the 
narro,.r 
respective members. Under this/conception of the 
federal or transnational European 
constitutional role of a/bill of rights, the/Court's 
developing doctrine of fundamental Coit".munity rights 
could have an integrative impact only indirectly, as 
Community legislation, respecting these fundamental 
guarantees, preempts new areas of the national legal 
order. 
The operation of this indirect effect can be 
perceived, for example, in Rutili v. Minister for the 
184 
Interior __ 1, where the Court used fundamental rights 
concepts to interpret Article 48 of the EEC Treaty 
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(concerning the free movement of workers\ as well as 
the Community's implementing regulations and directives, 
in order to determine if French administrative law 
was in compliance therewith. Drawing on various 
sources, including the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Court first concluded that the freedom 
of movement and equality of treatment demanded by 
the first two clauses of Article 48 were "fundamental 
principles". From this conclusion, the Court reasoned 
that any derogation from these rights "on the grounds 
of that Article, 
of public policy", as permitted by clause (3)/ must 
185 
be "interpreted strictly".-/ The Court of Justice 
thus did not directly require French law to observe 
fundamental Community rights. Rather, the result 
was reached indirectly in the process of interpreting 
the Treaty and the secondary legislation thereunder. 
Nonetheless, to an American observer, the parallels 
with Supreme Court analysis of suspect legislative 
classifitations, requiring "strict scrutiny" under 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
1 ' 11 b ' k' 
1861 sure y w~ e str~ ~ng.--
At any rate, it should be recalled that allef Justice 
tv1..arshall' s narrcNl vie:l'l did not resist for long the test of 
histocy in ~.rrerica. The stocy of this basic developrent 187 I 
might one future day provide a valuable precede.11t for Europ:an 
developrents. 
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v. The "Mightv Problem" in Eurooean Integration ...1§§.1 
Not surprisingly, the Court's efforts to prevent 
national constitutional attacks on Community legislation 
by developing a Community "bill of rights" have raised 
,as not...od, 189/ 
anew the issue of democratic legitimacy, which/over 
the centuries has remained ~~e "mighty problem" of 
judicial review. Indeed, as stated by both the majority 
and the dissenting opinions of the Bundesverfassungsqericht 
in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, this question is 
• 
central to the more Dnmediate concern of whether 
Community law is superior to even the constitutional 
law of the Member States.. In this debate, curiously, 
the question posed is less the acceptability of judicial 
190; 
review than its adequacy in providing a final 
protection of fundamental rights in the absence of 
a written "bill of rights". At controversy is not so 
~~ 
much judicial review7as the legitimacy of Community 
supremacy. The way in which the question is presented 
thus suqgests the profound changes in European 
attitudes towards judicial review that have taken place 
in recent decades. Nonetheless, because the question 
of Community supremacy vis-~-vis even national 
constitutional guarantees is so vital to the future 
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progress of legal integration, some reconsideration 
v of the "mighty problem" seems imperative • 
........, A. 'Ihe Legitimacy Problem of carnimity Judicial Review -
E~cially in the'Human Rights Area 
The two sides of this latest European version of 
the debate are well articulated by the majority and 
minority opinions of the German Constitutional Court. 
In the words of the majority: 
i!/he present state of integration of the 
Community is of crucial importance. The Community 
still lacks a democratically legitimated parliament 
directly elected by general suffrage which 
possesses legislative powers and to which the 
Community organs empowered to legislate are fully 
responsible on a political level; it still lacks 
in particular a codified catalogue of fundamental 
rights, the substance of which is reliably and 
unambiguously fixed for the future in the same 
way as the substance of the Constitution •..• As 
long as this legal certainty, which is not 
guaranteed merely by the decisions of the European 
Court of Justice, favourable though these have 
been to fundamental rights, is not achieved in the 
course of further integration of the Community, 
• • . the iGerma~/ Constitution applies. 1~; 
And so runs the response of the minority: 
The argument that the fundamental rights of the 
Constitution must prevail over secondary 
Community lat>~ because the Community still lacks 
a directly legitimated parliament is not in itself 
conclusive. The protection of fundamental rights 
and the democratic principle are not interchangeable 
inside a democratically constituted Community 
based on the idea of freedom; they complement one 
another. vfuile the achievement of the democratic 
principle in the EEC would cause the legislator 
and the executive to be more deeply concerned 
with fundamental rights, this would not make the 
judicial protection of fundamental rights 
superfluous. 192j 
- 77 -
The debate, thus cast, asks what is the sine oua non ---
of a government based on the concept of ordered liberty. 
t ,J 
Certainly parliamentary democracy is an important 
part of the answer, and Y.e think many would agree that 
the transfer of legislative powers to the now 
directly-elected European Parliament would be a 
progressive step both for integration and for the 
protection of fundamental rights at the Community 
level. However, it is unlikely that ·parlianentary rule . 
"Till soon l::e adopted in the Communi ty1 and, at any rate, we 
do not believe that establishment of a strong European 
Parliament would moot the question of 
the desirability of judicial protection of fundamental 
rights. Judicial protection of fundamental 
rights would still be needed even in a parliamentary 
Community.
193 1 The real questions then are, (i) what 
court should be empowered to review Community 
legislation for fidelity to fundamental rights,and 
(ii) what standards are needed to guide that court 
in ch~sing those rights that are indeed fundamental. 
~) ~ lt is evident that in the Community one 
would naturally choose to entrust the Court of Justice 
with the task of protecting fundamental rights 
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from incursions by Community legislation, if for 
no other reason (andw~ believe it is an important 
reason) than that only the Court of Justice can speak 
for the whole Community and thus preserve legal 
uniformity in the Community.-:) 
(' Therefore, if we are to permit t.'I-J.is important 
(whether _or-· not 
responsibility to devolve instead upon the severalsuprere I 
constitutional)courts of the Member States-- a 
development sure to impede Community integration and 
thus contrary to the Community's own Grundnorm -- we 
to do so 
must be compelled/by reasons strong enough to overcome 
our presumption in favor of the Court of Justice. 
l fii)~ The principal reason for disfavoring the 
L apparently 
Court of Justice, and/the decisive reason for the 
majority of the German Constitutional Court, is that 
the Court of Justice peculiarly lacks that most basic 
tool of constitutional adjudication: a written 
Community bill of rights. This fact furthermore may 
be argued to cut doubly against the Court's claim 
to the role of ultimate guarantor of fundamental rights 
in the Community. For it means on the one hand that 
Ccmnunity 
we have no way of knowing what -fundamental rights 
are apart from the pronouncement of the Court of Justice. 
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No one can point to them in a document and insist 
on their being respected by the Judges. Thus these 
rights must sean especially insecure. Second, the 
lack of a written bill of rights may be said to 
demx:r tic 
weaken theJlegitimacy of the judicial undertaking 
itself. Judges,as has ~noted, are not democratically 
responsible, or at least less so than elected 
194 1 
representatives.--- Thus when in constitutional 
cases they substitute their own will (or,more 
stricly,some vague and undocumented principle of 
"higher law") for that of the legislature and thereby 
invalidate duly-enacted laws, democracy is said to 
suffer. If, on the other hand, the norms that they 
apply in striking down legislation can be drawn 
directly from a constitution adopted by the people 
or their representatives, then, so the argument 
goes, it is not the irresponsible judges who have 
frustrated the people's will, but the people 
1951 
themselves.___;_~ l 
Attractive as these arguments may be at first 
glance, [they turn out jon closer examination( not to be-
very compelling at all, and certainly- not compelling 
enough to overcome our presumption in favor of giving 
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the Court of Justice the ultimate judicial authority 
in the Community as regards questions of fundamental 
rights.~ First, it should be observed that these 
arguments contra the Court's supremacy are rooted in 
the idea that there is a sharp contrast between judicial 
"interpretation" and "law-making" and that precise 
ub . provisicns . 1 th f s stant~ve are essent~a to e existence o 
legal rights and to the judicial nature of a legal 
decision. '!'his, havever, is a fundamental misconception 
of ~~e law, and especially so in the case of fundamental 
rights. In the adjudication of fundamental values, the 
hardly 
written text can be more than a starting point 
of the judicial inquiry. Witness, for example, ~~e 
rights that, in American constitutional law, have been 
subsumed under the authority of the due process and 
197 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth k~endment.----/ 
These practically empty vessels have been found to 
contain almost all the specific rights enumerated in the 
original Bill of Rights. Although textua.l in the sense 
that they can be located sornawhere in the Constitution, 
these rights can have found their way into the 
Fourteenth Amendment only by appeal to such important 
extra-textual sources as "tradition" and "general consensus," 
the "idea of progress," "natural law ,. etc. Without 
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these .supplemental sources, such key concepts as 
freedom have had 
due process,/and equality could/ no ascertainable meaning. 
Thus, the key concepts of any bill of rights 
concrete 
can havejmeaning only if we seek interpretive 
assistance from sources outside the text. To be sure, 
these outside sources are themselves supposed to be 
objective and verifiable. Yet we share the scepticism 
of the critics of a value-protecting approach to judicial 
review ~~ that by glossing the text of a bill of 
rights with these extra-textual values judges somehow 
make judicial review "impersonal/' "noncreative" and 
merely "interpretive." Indeed,we are sceptical that there 
is a sharp difference between "interpretive" and "non-
199;and 
interpretive" judicial review, ----;that the Court of 
Justice when it articulates and protects fundamental 
values without benefit of a written bill of rights is 
doing something significantly different than, say, the 
when it does so on the basis of the Grun:lg:setz 
German Bundesverfassungsgerichtl Impersonal values 
simply do not exist. Values protected by means of 
judicial review are inevitably, to a 
certain extent
1 
judge-made, and such fundamental rights 
as we enjoy depend much more on the vigilance of the 
judges th~n~e words of the text.~/ Thus, although 
written billSof rights havebeen historically important 
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to the protection of fundamental rights, they are neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition to the identification 
and protection of these rights. 
l_B. No Better Legitimacy of National Courts ftFundamental 
values, then, are inevitably, to a certain extent, judge-
made. This conclusion, which we believe is difficult to 
refute since it is borne out by world-wide historical 
experience, has in addition important implications for the 
illegitimacy objection to the Court of Justice's becoming 
ultimate arbiter of fundamental rights in the Community. 
For it seriously undermines the claim by national courts 
such as the BundesverfassQ~gsgericht that they possess 
superior legitimacy. Their claim is of course that 
adjudication must be "enabled by law , " rather than by such 
broad standards as "general principles" or, for that matter, 
"equity", Kreason," and the like. Indeed, this is part of 
what in Civil Law countries has been called the "principle 
of legality" or "Rechtsstaatsprinzip," i.~., the "rule of 
law." And, since law is often identified with legislation, 
the majoritarian will, which characterizes democratic 
leqislation, thus indirectlv becomes an element of leqitimate 
adiudication as well. 
Yet we all know that the "law" is to a large extent a myth 
and never more so, as we have just observed, than when 
the legal text is a bill of rights in which vague value-concepts 
are largely inevitable. 
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Moreover, because constitutions demand relative 
~utability, the text of a bill of rights is apt to 
speak with the voice of a ghostly, long-dead majority. 
The argument is thus a frail one indeed upon which 
to rest the legitimacy of judicial protection of 
fundamental rights. We must therefore seek elsewhere 
for the legit~acy of judicial review. 
lr · ·(/ ~· Where Legitimacy of Judicial Review Rests ~In our 
view the· error is in seeking the legitimacy of judicial 
review -- and, more generally, of judicial law-ma~ing --
in the same criteria which legitimize legislation. The 
democratic legitimacy of judicial decision-making depends, 
rather, on other criteria, criteria, more importantly, which 
apply as well to the Court of Justice· as to the 
Buru?emrerfassungsgerldlt or any other national court. Fo:reiCSt 
among the~~ the procedural characteristics of the -
judicial process, which restrain the judicial power, for 
no one wants judges unrestrainedly making law, and 
develop in the judiciary the vision to see and articulate 
the values that society holds fundamental . These basic 
characteristics are the connection of adjudication with 
~ ~ 
cases and controversies, hence with "parties," and the 
impartial attitude of the adjudicator who must not judge 




and must be assured a degree of 
• 
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independence from outside pressures, especially those 
201 1 
coming from the "political" branches.- Thus, these 
for It]al'lY c;e.."lt!Jri.es 
rules of what;has been called "natural justice" demand that 
the judge be super partes, and, therefore, that he 
not decide in his own case and be not subject to partisan 
pressures; also, they demand that the parties, all of 
~~e parties, be given a fair opportunity to be heard 
personally or through ~~eir representatives by the 
. ~ h th JUdge. A third rule, whet er or not implied in ose 
two, is no less fundamental. It indicates that, unlike 
both the legislative and the administrative processes, 
the judicial process is not initiated by the adjudicator 
on his own ·motion/ "ex officio": it needs a claimant/ 
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a plaintiff, an actor to be initiated -- if not also 
to be further carried on once it has been brought by 
203; 
the party to the court.-- These are the basic 
characteristics which so deeply differentiate the 
judicial process from the "political" ones, and these 
characteristics are, at one and the same time, the 
basic limits but also the formidable and unique 
strength of that process. 
J ·1 
The above characteristics are, of course, formal 
or structural-procedural in nature. They indicate 
the mode, .or the basic contours of the mode, of the 
judicial action. Their procedural nature, however, 
should not be taken as a limitation of their 
204; 
importance.-- Indeed, the fact that such 
characteristics are of a procedur~l and structural 
nature may indicate that they are, to some extent, 
more stable and less subject to radical transformations 
than would be the case with characteristics of a 
205; 
substantive nature. Even though the "concretization" 
of those characteristics may, and indeed does, vary 
from time to time and from place to place, they mark 
the contours, as it were, of the very nature of the 
judicial process, no matter where and when. Their 
flexibility might be great, but not unlimited. A 
judge who decides a case not brought to him by a party; 
a judge who does not give the parties a reasonable 
- · 86-
themselves: 
opportunity to defend a judge who decided 
his own case -- such a judge might still wear the 
judicial robe and call himself a judge, but he .would no 
~ 206 1 
longerYa judge.~ 
~D-~ Judicial Review as a Tool to Strenqthen a System's 
Democ::atic Leqi t:i .macy~ . --- · ~e IS 'dlese -procedural qualities, moreover, 
that make the courts and judicial review so essential 
purest parlian'entary 
(and hence legitimate) even in the/democracy,Z01/ 
of course 
which lthe Community is far fran being. Because access 
to the courts requires only a complaint, the courts 
protect the overall representativeness of the democratic 
persoo.s and 
system by affording a hearing . to/groups who cannot 
gain access to the political process.
2081 
In addition, 
as Professor Martin Shapiro has noted, speaking in 
particular of the u.s. Supreme Court, 
The Court's proceedings are judicial; that is 
they involve adversary proceedings between two 
parties viewed as equal invididuals. Therefore, 
marginal groups can expect a mu~~ more favorable 
hearing from the Court than from bodies which, 
quite correctly, look beyond the individual to 
the political strength he can bring into the 
arena. The Court's powers are essentially 
political. Therefore marginal groups can expect 
of the Court the political support which they 
cannot find elsewhere. ~/ 
Shap±ro's emphasis on the "judicial" nature of 
the proceedings, notwithstanding the "political" 
character of the powers exercised through these 
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proceedings, offers the clue to a further consideration. 
Surely, democratic government is essentially one in which 
people enjoy an equal opportunity to "participate," a 
right which is nowhere completely guaranteed by the right 
to vote alone, and certainly not by that right as it exists 
in the Community today. Hence, in theory at least, the 
Court has a potential for reinforcing the Community system's 
democratic character. In practice, of course, the real 
question indeed, the very concrete aspect of the ''mighty 
problem'' in the Community -- is who shall have the final 
judicial voice on questions of fundamental rights. Is the 
Court of Justice somehow unsuited to this task? 
Judges, including, of course, the Judges of that Court, 
can themselves become distant bureaucrats, insulated from 
their time and society, but when this occurs healthy 
democratic systems, and, we believe, the Community too, have 
the capacity to intervene and correct -- through the 
instruments of reciprocal controls. Thus, unacceptable 
judicial law-making can be repealed by legislation and, at 
the apex, even by constitutional or Treaty amendment. 2101 On 
the other hand, the Judges can find in the very "nature" 
of their judicial proceedings 211 1 the formidable antidote 
to the danger of their losing contact with the people. £1£1 
Even when they decide disputes of broad societal significance 
-- as is often the case especially with adjudication of 
"constitutional" questions -- their very function still is 
to decide actual "cases and controversies" rooted in 
----daily life and daily brought to them by the -----~ 
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interested members of the community, or by some of these 
members, or -- as is often the case with the European Court 
referred to them by courts in ~~e Member States; in this 
sense, the judicial process, including that of the Court 
at Luxembourg, is par excellence a participatory process. 
Moreover, the qualities that suit the Court to 
the search for fundamental values are, in part, a product 
of its very function. As Professor Alexander Bickel 
most vividly described in relation to the o.s. Supreme 
Court, there is in the Court a unique combination of, 
on the one hand, what he called a scholar's ninsulationn 
which is ncrucial in sorting out the enduring values 
of a societyn -- and, on the other hand, the concern 
nwith the flesh and bloodn of actual cases, as opposed 
to the legislator who deals ntypically with abstract or 
di~y foreseen problems.n~ As noted above, this 
unique combination is, in :fact, also the unique potential 
strength of the judicial function. It give~ ~e courts 
the possibility to be in continuous contact wi~a 
actual and most concrete problems of society, while at 
and detac:brtent 
the same time giving them enough independence/ from the 
moment's pressures and whims. Indeed, it is this 
combination that ~predestinesn the courts, in the long 
run, as Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr., put it, 
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to be a voice of reason, charcred with the creative 
function of discerninq afresh and of articulatinq 
and develooinq impersonal and durable Princioles.214/ 
l_To sum up and answer our question -- is the Court of 
~ 
Justice somehow unsuited to this challenge? -- our conclusion~ 
is: we do not see how, and we thus can see no reason why 
the presumption in favor of its judicial supremacy, even 
on questions of fundamental rights, should be overcome. 
Conclusion ========== 
The tremendous difficulties undertaken bv the 
European Court of Justice in the attempted constitutional 
evolution of the European Community are obvious enough. 
Everybody appreciates that Europe is not like, say, the 
American Onion. Differences are mo12profound; they involve 
cultures and languages as well as political and social 
mores, religious attitudes and, not least, economic 
structures and conditions. Nor are the Treaties of the 
European Community like the o.s. Constitution. Thus, in 
profound ways, the task undertaken by the European Court. 
has been, and will continue to be, much more controversial 
and difficult than that, itself controversial and difficult 
enough, of its American counterpart. It has had to 
define the powers and limits of a new, unique legal order with 
minimal constitutional guidance. It has had no clear supremacy 
clause and--------------------------------------------------------~ 
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no bill of rights. It has had no support from a 
strong central government: not from the European Parliament, 
recent 
for this Parliament, even with the/blessing of election 
by universal suffrage,still possesses only advisory and 
supervisory, not legislative powers; not from the Council 
of Ministers, for the Council is notoriously the least 
Community-oriented of all the Community organs; and not 
from the Commission I since for a decade and" a half this 
organ's powers have been drastically reduced by national, 
or nationalistic, interests and rivalries. 
1 ironically 1 
There is, of course, a risk thatjthe Court's daring 
vision of a strong Community may have subtly contributed 
to the Community's very difficulties in developing strong 
political institutions.215 I For it seems reasonable 
to conjecture that the Member States might, for example, 
have permitted the Council to adopt policy more frequently 
by majority or qualified majority voting if there had 
' 
been developed no such sweeping doctrines as those of 
the direct effect, suprenacyPl=~'f"~"f Community law. If 
so, the Council might have become more than the diplomatic 
round table that it is today. On the other hand, it is 
hard to imagine the Court's jurisprudence developing in 
any other way or at a less rapid pace than it has, given 
the Court's vision of a strong Community. Questions such 
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as direct effec~ supremacy and human rights have been 
simply too important to await a later day when the 
council and Commission too might have shared this 
vision. There is no such thing as incremental supremacy. 
The issue, once given away, could not, under normal 
circumstances at least, have been regained. 
Thus, it is partly because of the absence of strong 
political institutions that the Court's bold 
undertaking -- from supremacy to human rights has 
216 1 
been and remains so necessary.-- The question, of 
course, could be asked once again why should such 
a task be left to a court?Bu~,W:hile we have tried to 
answer that old and abstract question in its more 
general terms, in its most real terms the problem is 
not one of abstract legitimacy; rather, it is a very 
concrete problem of whether the European Court of 
Justice will have enough t~e, fir.mnestn?imagination, 
and will command enough respect, to be able to develop, 
in connection with cases and controversies brought to 
its jurisdiction, such a coherent body of decisions 
as can eventually be looked upon as authoritative in 
<....eyen in such sensitive areas as human rights.~ 
the Community, l No abstract answer can be given to this 
problem, since the answer depends on the infinite 
~ponderables of ·the political life of peoples and 
communities. Ours can only be a hope, not a certainty 
--and a beiief that Europe's best future lies in 
integration. 
- g2 -
It is, however, an educated hope -- supported 
by many arguments, by strong pressures, and by clear 
indications of converging trends. Let us mention a 
few of them. 
J 
First, if it is plausible that today Europe is 
much more diverse than the American Union, it seems 
unlikely that diversity is more profound in the 
Old Continent today than it used to be not only 
218; 
two centuries ago,-- but even less ~~an one hundred 
years ago, in a country of continental size with 
many races and religions, the combination of enormous 
wealth and striking misery, the wounds of civil war 
and slavery, and with a European-like, refined, 
industrialized East, a colonial-like Deep South, an 
agrarian Middle West, and an adventurous Far West. 
Sec·o~cial and economic pressures toward 
integration in Europe, .which call for legal interventions, 
are great and lasting. Such pressures come from 
millions of Southern Europeans who live as migrant 
workers in the North, as well as from the many and 
powerful multi-national corporations which are but the 
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reflection of the necessarily multi-national character 
of modern economic processes and structures. They come 
from the increasingly integrated culture of 
individuals and groups throughout Europe. They come 
from the growing awareness that the achievement of a 
supranational dimension, political, economic, and legal, 
is the most natural solution to the bizarre, untenable 
situation of the present division of a relatively small 
Continent into more than twenty allegedly "sovereign" 
219; 
states, -- as well as from the awareness that, by 
universalizing fundamental values, peoples will grow 
rrore and rrore unbearable 
closer, the/risks of conflicts · and wars will diminish, 
and new enriching syntheses will emerge from divergent 
customs, cultures, races and traditions?
20
1 
These syntheses, in Europe as in America, are 
born of pluralism. In the legal order, national 
statutory law, once virtually the only"law of the 
land" at least in Continental Eurq:e, now has many 
companions and competitors: the "higher · law" of the 
constitutions; the laws of the Community , .,.,hich 
also claim a "higher law" status, higher even than 
that of national constitutions; written and unwritten 
"general principles," both national and transnational; 
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national and multi-national bill of rights .••. And with 
all that a new role for adjudicators naturally emerges, 
because the adjudicators' role is always enhanced and 
magnified by pluralism and competition of law-making 
sources. Pluralism and competition demand comparison and 
control; they demand judicial review. 
At the highest level of transnational constitutional 
adjudication, pluralism and competition require the 
synthesis of common norms, of fundamental values applicable 
to all the member states. As put by a noted German commentator, 
To-evoive common principles from the various 
constitutional systems of the member states a 
comparative method is needed. What does this mean? 
It is not possible to transfer definite formulations 
or details from the one or the other national order •••• 
The general principles observed in the Community 
must be uniform, they cannot vary from case to case 
according to the nationality of the parties 
concerned. The comparative analysis cannot cling 
to particular details, but must follow the general 
trend of the evolution of legal prescriptions; 
it must lead to a result acceptable in all member 
states. Its object must be to find ~~e rules best 
suited to express a common tradition and compatible 
with the structure of the Community.2~ 
Common principles and traditions are clearly not the 
mechanical sum, but rather the selective choice of the "best" 
and "most suitable" principles and traditions found in the 
Member States. 
The search for such principles and traditions clearly 
requires great discretion, wisdom and restraint. The nature 
of the judicial process, we think, peculiarly suits this 
search and enables the judiciary, perhaps more than the 
political branches, to discover and articulate common 
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1 . It is perhaps more common to speak of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community 
and the European Atomic Energy Community together as the 
European Communities. In view of their extensive 
institutional integration, however, we have cho&en to refer 
to them collectively as the European Community. 
2. Similarly, lack of judicial review remained one of the 
principal~ses of European efforts in the nineteenth 
and first half of the twentieth centuries to est~lish 
:€lie supr~~acy of ~I}$titutionallaw ana_me_aning"fUl "c~esJis 
on legislative powers. 
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l (2J..., 
~e I I~B.~ ~nfra. See also Cappelletti, The Significance 
of Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, in 1g~ 
~!!i£gtum=~n~1~:&:=~es:s;§chn!.!; f~a=~~-~~~n§~~~ 14 7 
(E. von Caemmerer, s. Mentschikoff and K. Zweigert eds. 
1969) Lhereinafter cited as Significance of Judicial Review/. 
For the history of judicial review~~ generally ~.Ca~~ll~tti . 
~ygJ.~isl.B~i~~_j,b~.cg~~i~raq._!!o~.J.g ( 1 9 71 ) 
Lhereinafter cited as JYS#Ci~l-i!~#~~~~ and~· ~~2al1~.!;.!;i 
&. ~ • ~~~n, ~~;:s.t,U~ Ji~n§t1.!;}i.!;~S~n~l,1~~ ch. 1 ( 1 9 7 9) 
~~ereinafter cited as ~~i~~~X~~on~l~s~/. For a 
preliminary report touching on certain aspects of the role 
of judicial review in legal inteqration, ~ Cappelletti, 
The 'Mighty Problem' of Judicial Review and the Contribution 
of Comparative Analysis, 53 g- ~sl· ~· Bev. 409 (1980), 
also published, with some revisions, in 1979/2 ~gal::l~§!:!~§ 
~.J;ur.,212~sn..In:S:ega~io!a 1 Lhereina£ter cited from this 
lactsr version, unless otherwise indicated, as Mighty Problem/. 
3. See J. Weiler, Supranationalism Revisited - Retrospective 
and Prospective: The European Communities after Thirty 
Years 79-83 {ECr~Internal ~ Pat;:er No~ 2, European Uni-verSity 
Institute, Florence, 1981). 
4. This challenge is, in many ways, an ftaccess-to-justiceft 
challenge. The access~to-justice challenge is not, of 
course, found only in federal or transnational unions. 
' J 
it is pr~~e~t world~wide. ~ generally ~g4es~~Q,~S§~i=~ 
(M. Cappelletti gen. ed. 1978-79); Vol. I, Books 1 & 2: 
A Weald Suryey (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds.1978) ·; Vol.II, Ecoks 
[ 1 & t: Promising ·Institutions (M. Cappelletti & - J. Weisner eds ~-
-=-~= ---==-== 
\ 1978-1979); Vol. III: Emergin~ Issues and Pers~ctives 
' ==-=- ===== =-= ===-===== . 
(M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1979); Vol. IV: Access to 
====-== == 
!il,U3J;4:&§ ~~ sa ~:!;haQl2olg~~,ial f~:i~~ti~~ (K.F. Koch ed. 
1979). ~especially M. Cappelletti & B. Garth, Access 
to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make Rights E'ffective. 
A General Report, in !S·' Vol. I, Book 1, at 3-124. 
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5. This would seem to be true at least to the extent 
that there is a converging recognition among Western nations 
of a common core of fundamental rights. 
6. Comparative scholarship, unlike, say, natural law 
theories, seeks a common core of fundamental values in the 
tangible corpus of positive law of various countries (~ 
Schlesinger, The Common Core of Legal Systems: An Emerging 
Subject of Comparative Study, in XX~=~~~~aY~~QIDi~;s~iv~ 
and CQD~li~~~ ~g~ 65, K. Nadelman, A. von Mehren & J. Hazard :a===--------•---
eds. 1961}, as well as convergences and divergences in the 
evolution of that positive law -- and the reasons for such 
convergences and divergences (~ Com~~~g~~Y~-~~~st'l L~~' 
supra note 2, passim}. 
7. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms was signed in Rome in 1950 and entered 
into force in 1953. It can be read in European Treaty 
Series LEurop. T. s~7 No. 5 (1950). There have been several 
subsequent Protocols to the Convention: Protocol 1, Europ. 
T.S. No. 9 (1952); PJ:otocol 2, Europ. T.S. No. 44 (1963}; 
Protocol 3, Europ. T.S. No. 45 (1963}; PJ:otocol 4, Europ. 
T.S. No. 46 (1963); and Protocol 5, Europ. T.S. No. 55 (1966). 
8 • 5 U. s . ( 1 Cranch) 1 3 7 ( 1 8 0 3 ) • 
9. See ~g~iaJm!§Yie~~> supra note 2, at 26~2 7, 52 and 
the references therein. 
10. ~~J,TQ~~~~~~ 1 ~~=l~ oem~c~atie,e~~erigy~ 
179-80 (1840}. 
11. See generally Mighty Problem, supra note 2. 
12. See Chief Justice .Burger's dissent in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 472 (1972). 
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13. Citations seem superfluous; they would include 
much of the library-sized American literature on judicial 
review. Solely for the benefit of non-American readers, 
I will refer to the discussion and the selected 
bibliographical information in the influential 
university textbook by ~=-~~~~a' ~g~~~=g~~=~g~~~ig~~=g~ 
~Qna~~~~~iQ~g~=~g~ 3-25 (10th ed., 1980). 
For a recent insightful discussion by a noted 
European jurist ~ Koopmans, Legislature and Judiciary 
--Present Trends 1 in_ ~~~-~~a~~~~~·~~~=~ga=g=~Qmmg~=~g~=g~ 
~~ag2§ 309-337, especially at 322-332 (M. Cappelletti ed. 
1978) Lhereinafter cited as ~§~ R~~~~~~~~~~~~-
A most recent and unconditional, but alas, pretty 
insular plea by a British authority against judicial 
review -- indeed, more generally, against "a written 
constitution, a Bill of Rights, a supreme court, and the 
rest" --is Professor J.A.G. Griffith's Chorley Lecture, 
The Political Constitution, 42 ~g~. ~- ~~~· 1, 17 (1979). 
14. Recent debaters have included ~· ~§~~~~' ~QY~~~gn~ 
g~ ~Y~~~~s~ (1977); ~- ~~g~~a' ~~~~~~g~ ~~~~~~ g~~ ~g~ 
Nstig~g~ ~g~~~~~g~ ~~g~~a~= ~ ~~~~tig~g~ ~~~g~~~~~ag~~g~ 
of ~g ~g~~ g~ ~g~ g~a~~ ~g~~~ (1980); ~- ~g~, ~~~ ~g~~ 
g~ ~~ g~~E~m~ ~gy~~ ~~ ~~~~~g~ ~g~~~~~~ <1976); 
~- ~· g1~, ~~mg~~s~~ g~~ ~~~~~~~ (1980); Fiss,Foreword: 
The Forms of Justice, 93 ~g~· ~· ~~~· 1 (1979); Grey, 
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in 
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 g~s~· ~· B~Y· 843 (1978) 
Lhereinafter cited as Origins/; and id., Do We Have an 
Unwritten Constitution, 27 g~s~· ~· ~~~· 703 (1975) 
Lhereinafter cited as Unwritten Constitution/. The list 
is by no means exhaustive. 
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Judicial Review, supra note 2, 16 See Signif~cance of 
at 149-50. Cappelletti & 
. J . ~ . 
Adams, Judi~ial Review of Legislation 
::E~u~r:.::O:.:E:.::e:.::an::.:....:An.=· :.:.;t::.:e::;c::.:e::;d::.e::.n:.:..;:;t;:;s-.-:::an:::.;:d~A.;;:d;;. a ;.;;P;...t;;.;a;;;.t.;;.;· ~;;;.· o;;;.n=s , 7 9 §g~. ~. - ~~;g. 
1207 (1966). 
17. See I v.c., infra. 
18. ~udic!al.~g~g~, supra note 2,. at 33.,..34 and the 
references therein. 
19. Id. at 35. 
20. The famous passage by Montesquieu describL~g judges 
as "la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi, des etres 
inanimes qui n'en peuvent moderer ni la force, ni la 
rigueur," is contained in Book XI, Chapter VI of Q$=l!esBrit 
~e~=.lo~, ~ 1 Q!jYvre~om:Qletes_£e Montesgyieu 217 
(A. Masson ed. 1950). 
21. ~~ia.l~fiiew, supr_! note 2, at 36 and the 
references therein;~~~-..!.·~·' ~' The Civil Law 
Tra91 ticn ch.. m < 1969). 
22. ~-~lacks~Qn~, ~o~~n~s~i~s_g~=~e Law~ of~ngland 
157-159 (1765). ~also ~.g. fo~i~, ~he="~igher_Lawn 
as~Ound Q~g;~gn=~Qn~!~~ional_La~ 86 (1963). 
23. ~ generally ~· at 87 et passim. 
24. Significance of Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 158. 
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25. As is well known, Bentham emphasized the vices of 
judiciary law, which in his opinion was uncertain, 
obscure, confused, and difficult to ascertain. Hence 
his advocacy of codification. See Ih~~~!l~a~!~=~Q;~§ 
Q~~~~~~~~, Q£:Lsws=i~n§;gl, especially at 
184-95, 232-36, 239-40 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970). Cf. 
Barwick, Judiciary Law: Some Observations Thereon, 
33 ~~n~ ~1 g~~· 239 (1980) (pointing out that 
Bentham realistically did not expect codification to 
eradicate judiciary law). 
26. ~ -!t:od.:Jgil. b~!~' supra note 2, at 32-33. The 
French Constitution of 1958, however, has substantially 
expanded the possibility of constitutional control of 
legislation. This development is more fully discussed 
at § II. S;{' infra. 
((1)) . 
27. ~Significance of Judicial Review~ supra note 2, 
at 149 and the references therein. 
28. g. 
29. Schultze, Environment and the Economy: Managing 
the Relationship, in B~!~ua~e~ fo• ~~~a~~ai~~~y;~ 
87, 88 (C. Hitched. 1978). As noted by the author, 
then chief economic adviser to President Carter: 
L!7he role of the government in the United 
States ••• until recently was conf~ed 
principally to a limited sphere of activities. 
These include producing or supporting the 
production of goods that private enterprise 
could not or should not handle; enforcing 
the rules of the game through contract law 
and antitrust policies; redressing through 
taxes and transfer payments the maldistribution 
of income; and for one reason or another, 
regulating a highly select sphere of private 
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activities, such as transportation, electric 
utilities, and financial institutions. 
But the chief characteristic of environmental 
and other health and safety side effects is that 
they are not restricted to any well-defined set 
of activities. Indeed, they are pervasive, 
running throughout the private production and 
consumption decisions of millions of business 
firms and hundreds of millions of consumers. 
~· ~also Arrow, Government Regulation: Pluses 
and Minuses, 39 ~~QID~lm~~~ 68 (1981) (reprinted 
from the March 1981 issue of Harper's Magazine). 
The author, .following Richard Musgrave, classifies 
the Government's functions in the welfare state in 
terms of ftallocation, distribution and stabilization.ft 
~· at 71. 
30. Id. As for affluence: 
Id. at 89. 
When we earn our daily bread by the sweat of our 
brow, amenities are not very importan:t.. But 
environmental amenities become terribly important, 
the less we sweat and the more bread we have. 
Urbanization, of course, by "sheer physical closeness," 
id., is a source of environmental problems, tensions, and 
damages. And, 
because we are technologically advancing, we 
create ••• new ways of despoiling the environment .•• 
L~fecause we are a dynamic economy, firms and 
production processes are constantly shifting 
about, so that environmental standards in any one 
location ••• have to change to accommodate the 
birth and death of fi.rms and establishments. 
And finally, because we are chemically inventive, 
we are continually increasing the numbers of new 
chemica~ compounds whose yet unknown side effects 
may be dangerous. 
Clearly, the problem of environmental externalities 
involves the challenge of ftLshaping/ m~llions of individual 
decisions ••• toward social ends without strangling our 
other goals, especially econo~c growth and reasonable 
freedom of choice.• Id. at 90. This is what Professor Arrow, 
supra note 29, at 71, calls the allocation function of 
government. 
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31. As Nobel prize winner Kenneth Arrow has observed: 
We have no .•• mechanism by which the pollution 
which a firm imposes on the ne~ghborhood is paid 
for. Therefore the firm will have a t~udency to 
pollute more than is desirable ••.. L§/ince it 
does not pay that cost, there is no profit 
incentive to refrain ••.. Thefe are many other 
examples of this kind, but Li~/ will serve to 
illustrate the point in question: some effort 
must be made to alter the profit-maximizing 
behavior of firms in these cases where it is 
imposing costs on others which are not easily 
compensated through an appropriate set of prices. 
Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 
21 E~· E~l'~ 306-o7 (1973>. 
32. Schultze, supra note 29, at 95-99. See also Arrow, 
supra note 31, at 310-17. 
33. ~· ~J:lmQ~g, ~~~ ~~g§ Q! ~~~i£~ ~g~ 95 (1977); and, 
see the analysis, which opens with Gilmore's definition, 
in Guido Calabresi's 1977 Holmes Lectures entitled The 
Common Law Function in the Age of Statutes (cited from the 
unpublished text kindly submitted by the author); see also 
Calabresi, Incentives, Regulation and the Problem of Legal 
Obsolescence, in~~~ E~~~~~£~!~~~' supra note 13, at 299. 
34. See,~-~·, A. Miller, Judicial Activism and American 
Constitutionalism: Some Notes and Reflections, in ~Qn~~i~~­
~~~l}gJ:~~m ( NQ~Q~-~) 3 3 3 , 3 58 ( J. Pennock & J . Chapman eds • 
1979) and Friedman, Claims, Disputes, Conflicts and the 
Modern Welfare State, in bg£§§§ ~Q ~Y§~i£~ ggg ~g ~~l!g~g ------ -- ------- --- ---. -------
Stg~g 251, 257 (M. Cappelletti ed. 1981). In an essay in 
the same volume a leadin~ French scholar speaks of "police 
~tate" -- which is indeed the fearful risk, but hopefully 
not the necessary result, of the welfare state. Tunc, 
The Quest for Justice, in id. at 315, 349. Ontheprofound 
netanort:hosis of administrative law in m:xJem AIIerica, ~, ~-~·' 
the penetrating study by Professor Stewart, The Fefonnation of 
Anerican Administrative Law, 88 HaJ:v. L. Fev. 1667 (1975). Much o~ 
==== = === 
what the author says about the United States ~d apply to Westem 
Europe as well. 
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35. Koopmans, supra note 13, at 314~15. 
36. The changes brought about by the welfare state are 
thoughtfully described by Professor (now Judge) Koopmans: 
L!/epresentative systems of government prided 
themselves on embodying, by their very nature, the 
consent of the governed: the people living under 
the law established by their own elected representa-
tives. Nowadays, ••• the thread between a vote 
cast for a Member of Parliament and the many 
decisions by public authorities affecting the voter 
has become very long and thin; it requires some 
imagination to see that these decisions are 
ultimately supported by an enabling statute in 
the far background. And the voter, apparently, 
is less inclined to see these decisions as 
"legitimate .. than he used to be. His misgivings 
in this regard. can be perceived throughout the 
major industrialized countries of the West. 
Id. at 315. 
37. The Constitution limits the legislative jurisdiction 
of Parliament by listing the subject matters within its 
competence (art. 34). All non-enumerated subjects are 
reserved to ~;5F~~diction of the "pouvoir r'glementaire," 
i.e. to the autonomous law-making power of the executive. 
To give but one example of the scope of the powers so 
shifted from the legislative to the executive branch, 
effective in 1976 the latter was able to enact by various 
decrees a new Code of Civil Procedure, thus replacing one 
of the five pillars of the Napoleonic codification 
sanctified by a tradition more than one and a half centuries 
old. See also ~~ d~~g~n§=g~=lg=~~~-§~-g~-~gg~~ID§n~. 
~~~~~li~~~~Q~-g~2-~~~~~~~g 3i=~~=~J=g~=lg=~Qn2~~~Y~~Qn=~~~~~g 
1~~~====~~~~=~~=~~~~~~£~£~~~ (Universite de Droit, 
d'Economie et de Science d'Aix-Marseille ed. 1978), and my 
report, Loi et reglement en droit compare, id. at 247. 
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38. See Koopmans, supra note 13, at 321. 
39. A comparative study of the constitutional protection 
of such procedural rights may be found in ~~m~g~g~~Y§ 
~~Il~.t.:J._1g~, supra note 2, chs. VI-XI. See ~ cappelletti, 
_--~ ~: -~-~ -~~-=-4:- -~~ ~--c~ . - - ~~ - : ~-y ~~~~~=-~--_ -~- :~- - - : 
Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Proceeding 
(General Report), in ~~~gm§n.tg~ ~Yg~gil~~~g 
~g~~!~g in ~!Yi1 ~~~~gg~~~~ I ~~g ~g~~~~~g 
g~g __ ~g~~i§g g~g ~~ ~·Q~g ~£~~~ 6 61 ::> 




40. Judgment of June 26, 1959, Conseil d'etat, L1952/ 
Dalloz, Jurisprudence LD. Jur~7 541, English translation 
in ~~mes~g~~~~=~~~g~~~=~g~, supra note 2, at 37-38. 
41. The preamble of the 1958 Constitution, which, in its 
turn, incorporates by reference both the Preamble of the 
1946 Constitution and the Revolutionary Declaration of 
1789, is the French Bill of Rights. 
42. See ~~mis•s~~~~~Qn~.t.:~=~g~, supra note 2, at 38-42. 
The invocation of ngeneral principlesn and nRepublican 
tradition" is nicely contrasted with the current practice --- ~ judicial review in the United States by .Professor Thomas 
Grey in Oriqins
1
supra note 14, at 844~47, and more 
extensively in Unwritten Constitution, supra note 14. See 
further notes 59-60 and accompanying text, infra. 
' 
- 105 -
44. See Judgment of July 16, 1971, Con. const., L19717 
Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran~aise LJ.o~2 
July 18, 1971, English translation in ~gm~g~g~~Y§ ~gn§~~~ 
~aw, supra note 2, at S0-51, and the remarkable comment 
by a lead~French constitutionalist, Professor M. Duverger, 
Le Monde, August 7, 1971, English translation in ~~IDBs~g~~~~ 
~~~gt'~_1g~, supra note 2, at 52-SS, openly ~ting t~ 
abandonment of centuries-old prejudices and the unreserved 
adoption in France of_ the Marbury v. Madison doctrine. 
For a more detailed analysis of this development ~ id. 
at 45-72, and the excellent study by Beardsley, 
Constitutional Review in France, 1975 g~~- ~~- ~~~· 189, 
225-237. 
French 
45. See art. 61 of the/Constitution, as amended in 1974. 
Originally, standing to challenge a not yet promulgated 
loi was limited to the President of the Republic, the 
Prime Ministe~ and the presidents of either Chamber of 
Parliament. Since the 1974 amendment, however, a 
Parliamentary minority of sixty members of either Chamber 
also has standing to challenge a not yet promulgated loi 
before the Conseil Constitutionnel. 
46. See the VerfassungsUberleitungsgesetz of May 1, 1945; 
see generally ~~gj..~~s1_B~~1~~' supra note 2, at 4~-~~ 7_ ~ _72-74. 
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47. For Italy~ arts. 134-137 of the Constitution; the 
constitutional laws of February 9, 1948, No. 1, and 
March 11, 1953, No. 1; and the ordinary law of March 11, 1953, 
No. 87. For Germany~ arts. 93-94, 99-100 of the Bonner 
Grundgesetz, and the ordinary law of March 12, 1951 on the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and subsequent amendments. See 
generally Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 50, 74-77. 
4',8. ~g. at 46-51; ~ ~ ~JDE%~~~~-~gn2~~=La!!:!J: 
sup~ note 2, at 12-17. A list of the countries that have 
adopted some form of judicial review of legislation after 
World war II would also have to include Japan (since 1947), 
Cyprus (1960), Turkey (1961), Yugoslavia (1963), Sweden 
(1964), Israel (1969), Greece (1975), Portugal (1976), and 
Spain (1978). Countries in which systems of judicial review 
are more ancient include Mexico, Switzerland (limited to 
Cantonal laws) and Norway (where judicial review has been 
knlDWn sin~ the 19th century), and Denmark (since the early 
20th century}. Judicial review is also known in most of 
the Common Law world outside of Great Britain. 
I 
49. The .tmpact of the Constitutional Courts in Germany and 
Italy, and~samewhat lesser extent in Austria, has been 
profound -- particularly,. as might be expected, in the area 
of human rights. To give but one example, all three 
Constitutional Courts, like their counterpart in the United 
States, almost contemporaneously decided on the constitutionalit· 
of abortion legislation; indeed, the same. is true even for 
the French Conseil Constitutionnel. The results, however, 
. were quite different .COml!re Judgment of January 1 5, 19 75, IJrenc±l 
\ - ... __ ; Con. const~ L1972/ D.Jur. 529; Judgment of October 11, 1974, 
~.?verfassungsgeric~f, L197!7 Erklaerungen des . 
1 Verfassungsgerichtshcfs 221 (both decisions u,pholding new_ 
liberal legislation) and Judgment of February 18,. 1975, .Litallagi' 
Corte cost., L1972/ 43 Raccolta ufficiale delle sentenze ·e 
ordinanze delle Corte costituzionale LRac. uff. corte cost~/ 
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201, i197~7 Giurisprudenza Costituzionale iGiur. Cost~/ 
117 (voiding in part an old "conservative" law), with 
Judgment of February 25, 197~~sverfassungsgericht, 
i197~/ 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerich~ 
iBVerfG~/ 1 (striking down a liberalizing statute). The 
decisions of the four courts can be found in English 
translation in ~~mgg~g~~~~ ~~~g~~1 ~g~· supra note 2, 
beginning at 577. 
SO. For a fuller discussion of the conditions prompting 
centralized versus 
the adoption of/decentralized control ~ ~~~~£~g1 ~~~~~~' 
supra note 2, chs. III-IV. See also Cappelletti, The 
Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental 
Difference - or no Difference at All? Lhereinafter cited 
as Stare Decisis/, in E~g~g£~~£~~ ~~~ ~~~~g~ g~~£g~~~ 381, 
383-392 (H. Bernstein, u. Drobnig & H. Katz eds. 1981). 
51. See ~~~~g~g1 ~~~~~~' supra note 2, at 54-SS. 
52. See id. at 55.,...60.. While it may be true that the 
difference in precedential impact between a decision of a 
court of last resort in the Common Law countries and, say, 
the French Cour de Cassation or the German Bundesgerichtshof 
today is less than in years past, see~.~., L ~- ~~~~~~~ 
& ~- ~g~~l ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ g~~ ~~g~~g~~~~~~~g~~~g 318 (1971)' 
such a difference -? is still important, although for reasons perhaps less 
attributable to the doctrine of stare decisis itself than 
to differences in the organization, procedures and personnel 
of the courts in the Civil and Common Law countries. See 
Stare Decisis, supra note SO, at 383-389; ~ also notes 
53-SS, infra, and accompanying text. 
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53. See Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 60-66; Stare 
======= ==== 
Decisis, supra note 50, at 383-392. 
54. It is true that the u.s. Supreme Court until early 
in this century also lacked discretionary power to decline 
to review cases raising issues of lesser significance. But 
its appellate jurisdiction during this earlier period was 
also more strictly limited to cases raising real 
constitutional or federal-state conflicts. See text at 
notes 90-91, infra. 
55. See ~~~~£~gl B~~~~~, supra note 2, at 63; Stare Decisis, 
supra note 50, at 387. 
56. Friedman, supra note 34, at 256; cf. Jug_!~~~J: ~ev~~~, 
supra note 2, ch. 2. 
57. Origins, supra note 14, at 846, citing ~~~g~~, supra 
note .14; Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 !~g.~·~- 1 (1971); Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L. J. 920 (1973); 
=-= = = 
Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 Xsl~ 
~- ~- 227 (1972); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and ·~roperty," 62 
~Q~~~l~ ~· ~· 405 (1977); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living 
Constitution, 54 ~~s· ~· ~~~· 693 (1976); Strong, 
Bicentennial Benchmark: Two Centuries of Evolution of 
Constitutional Processes, 55~-~·~·~~~· 1 (1976). 
58. See Origins, supra note 14, at 845; ~- ~gng, Ihg_~i~~ 
Qf B~ghts 70 (1962). 
59. Origins,supra note 14, at 846. 
60. Id. at 844 n. 8. 
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61. Id. 
62. ~ not-es 40-42 and accompanying text, supra. 
63. See§ IV.D.2., infra. 
64. See i§ IV.D.2. and v., infra. 
65. u.s. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
66. See, ~-~·' Levy, Introduction, in ~§§g~g g~ ~~ ~£~g 
of the Constitution . ix, xi-xii (L.Levy ed. 1969) ihereinafter 
cited as ~g§gy§/. Professor Levy provides a good,short 
account of the Convention. There are, of course, many other 
accounts as well. The basic document for the study of the 
Convention is ~g~~g~~' Ihg=~~~g~~g_Q~=~hg_~~~~~g~=~gny~~~£Qn 
(1911). 
67. The Articles of Confederation "had established what 
in the usage of the time was called a 'federal~ government, 
meaning a league or confederacy of autonomous or nearly 
sovereign states whose central government was their agent 
and could act only through them and with their consent." 
Levy, supra note 66, at xii. Levy adds that "the Articles 
failed mainly because there was no way to force the states 
to fulfill their obligations or to obey the exercise of 
such powers as Congress did possess." Id. For example, 
Congress depended for its funds upon the voluntary 
cooperation of the states, and requests were frequently 
denied. By 1786, Congress often even lacked the necessary 
quorum of nine state delegations for conducting its 
business. See Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: 
The Original Understanding, in Affi§#iQgn.#aw_gnS.Sh$ 
~g~g~i~~~£g~g~=~~g~~ 85, 86 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber eds. 
1978). 
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68. The resolution was adopted with the New York 
delegation divided and only Connecticut opposed. 1 
Farrand, supra note 66, at 30-31. 
69. Levy, supra note 66, at xiii, quoting James Madison's 
report to Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time. 
70. 1 7 u.s. ( 4 Wheat.) 31 6 ( 1819) • 
-71. The "necessary and proper" clause, art. 1, § _ 8, cl.18, 
is, of course, no more than an adjunct to the clauses 
granting specific powers. Thus, it is not always possible 
to separate expansive interpretations of the necessary and 
proper clause from expansive interpretations of the 
enumerated powers.~Kinsella v. United States Ex. Rel. 
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960) (the necessary and 
proper clause is "not itself a grant of power but a caveat 
that the Congress possesses all the means necessary to 
carry out" the powers specifically granted) with United 
States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (law providing for 
the escheat of property of veterans dying intestate is 
necessary and proper to Congress' enumerated power to raise 
armies and navies and conduct wars). It is perhaps 
significant that the former case questioned the validity 
of applying court martial procedures to civilians and thus 
involved a conflict between federal law and civil liberty 
guarantees. The ·latter involved a straight-forward 
conflict between federal and state law. In conflicts of 
the latter type, one may doubt whether there is any 
very meaningful life left to the old argument that Congress• 
enumerated powers are limited powers. According to -Professor Monaghan, "~radical transformation that has 
occurred in the structure of lour Federalism' in the nearly 
two centuries of our existence has emptied the concept of 
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nearly all legal content and replaced it with a frank 
recognition of the legal hegemony of the national 
government," Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our 
Federalism," La~_!_~Qilt§ID.E.:.._f~Q!2., Summer 19 80, at 39,39. ==-----------------
See ~ ~~g~~~, supra note 14, passim, arguing that 
federal-state relations are largely a political question 
and ill-suited to judicial mediation; Wechsler, The 
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 ~QJ:~· ~· ~gy. 543 (1954). But cf. National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (striking 
down 1976 amendments to .the Fair Labor Standards Act 
extending minimum wage and maximum hour regulations to 
state and local government employees); Kaden, Politics, 
Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 
~g~~· ~- ~~X· 847, 857-68 (1979). 
72. One of the principal goals motivating the adoption of 
the U.S. Constitution was the improvement of the chaotic 
conditions of commerce among the various states. Thus, 
art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 provided that Congress shall have the 
power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States " The framers' desire to create a 
national market is remarkably similar to a principal aim of 
the signatories of the EEC Treaty. As a source of legal 
integration the commerce clause has been important in two 
ways: first as a limitat~on on the states' powers to 
interfere with interstate commerce, and second as a positive 
source of federal legislative power. Federal power under 
the commerce clause has been enormously expanded by the 
Supreme Court in this century.c~rnnited States v. E.C. 
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (sugar refining monopoly not 
controllable by federal legislation because connection 
' between "manufacturing" and "commerce" was "indirect") 
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~ Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Congress 
may prohibit racial discrimination in restaurants since 
the restaurant business exerts a substantial economic effect 
on interstate commercd. But cf. National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Seegenerally Bogen, The 
Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry into the Limits of 
Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8 Wake 
== 
~Q;~i~ ~- ~~- 187 (1972). 
73. The last Lmportant ncn~elegation decisions occurred 
in 1935. P~ama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 u.s. 388 (1935); 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935). Today, the doctrine is virtually moribund. 
See,~-~·, Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976); National Cable Television Ass'n 
Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 236, 341-42 (1974). The 
modern growth of the federal bureaucracy has, however, 
revived interest in finding ways of making elected 
representatives more responsible for administrative law-
making. ~, ~-~·, ~~~,supra note 14, at 131-34, . . 
advocating revival of a non-delegation doctrine; Bruff & 
Ge·llhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative 
Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 ~ga~· ~- ~gy. 
1369 (1977), analyzing and criticizing proposals designed 
to increase Congressional oversight of administrative rule-
making; and McGowan, Congress, Courtsand Control of 
Delegated Power, 77 ~Ql~· ~- Bg~. 1119 (1977), 
criticizing Congress for shifting oversight responsibilities 
to the courts • 
74. Diplock, The Courts as Legislators, in Ih~=~g~~~ 
~~g-~~g~~~~ 263, 279 (B.W.Harvey ed. 1968). 
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75. An interesting attempt to create a guaranteed income 
through the courts is discussed in Krislov, The OEO Lawyers 
Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in 
the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58 ~· ~~~~· ~· 
~~X· 211 (1973). 
76. These were the positions of the ~es in, for 
example, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
77. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Prior to Cooley, the 
Supreme Court tried unsuccessfully to reach a consensus 
on how to resolve these conflicts. Sometimes the majority 
used a definitional analysis: state regulations of 
"commerce" were prohibited, but so-called "P='lice regulations .. were 
cons ti tu tional. See, e. 9:.. , Mayor of New York v. Miln ,. 
3 6 u . s . < 1 1 Pet • ) 1 a 2 < 1 a 3 7 > • 
78. H.P.Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, (1949). 
79. See, ~·9:.·, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), 
discussed in Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: 
A New Canon of Construction, 12 g~g~· ~· ~~X· 208, 218 . 
(1959). Professor Waelbroeck calls this the 
"conceptualist-federalist" approach to pre-emption 
problems (July 1979) (paper delivered at . a conference 
held in Bellagio, Italy; publication forthcoming). 
80. See, e.9:.., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218 (1941). 
81. See, ~·9:.·, Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 
624 (1973). 
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82. The parallels between the Court's preemption and 
commerce clause opinions are analyzed in Note, supra note 
79, passim. 
83. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 
(1941). 
84. ~, ~·~·, the preemption provisions of the Consumer 
Produc~Safety Improvements Act of 1976, 15 u.s.c. ! 1203. 
85. See Weiler, supra note 3, at 65-83. 
86 . u.s. canst. art. III, a 1 . 
87. Lower federal courts were established by the first 
Congress in 1789. 1 Stat. 73. 
88. In the words of Judge Cabell, 
/B/efore one Court can dictate to.another, .•. 
. It must bear, to that other, the relation of an 
appellate Court. The term appellate, however, 
necessarily includes the idea of superiority. 
But one Court cannot be correctly said to be ~ 
superior to another, unless both of them belong 
to the same sovereignty. It would be a 
misapplication of terms to say that a Court of 
Virginia is superior to a Court of Maryland, or 
vice versa. The Courts of the United States, 
therefore, belonging to one sovereignty, cannot 
be appellate Courts in relation to the State Courts, 
which belong to a different sovereignty - and of 
course, their commands or instructions impose 
no obligations. 
Quoted ~n Gunther, supra note 13, at 39-40. This 
=====:IIICZ 
contention was, of course, rejected by the Supreme Court 
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,14 u.s. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 u.s. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) 
(establishing Court review of state criminal convictions) • 
. / 
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89. See Bester, The American Civil War as a Constitutional 
Crisis, in L. Friedman and H. Scheiber eds., supra note 67, 
at 219, 233-34. 
90. For the first century and a quarter of its existence, 
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was defined by 
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85, 
which limited review to cases where the federal claim was 
rejected by the highest state court. Changes made by the 
Act of February 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385, 386, did not alter 
this scheme, which lasted substantially intact until 1914. 
See generally ~· ~g~~~' ~· ~~g~~~R' ~· §hg~~~g & ~· ~~£~g~~~' 
~s~~=~=~~~hg~~~~g=~~~=E~~~~g~=~g~~~g=g~~=~~=E~~~~g~=g~g~~ 
439-40 (2nd ed. 1973) Lhereinafter cited as ~~~ f~~~~sl 
~QYI~!i· There were in addition the extraordinary writs, 
but excepting the writ of habeas corpus these have been of 
minor importance. See also 28 u.s.c. § 2283, which 
prohibits federal courts from enjoining state proceedings 
except where expressly authorized by law. Cf. Dombrowski 
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (permitting injunction of 
state criminal proceedings); Fiss, Dombrowski~ 86 ~g~~ ~· 
~- 1103 (1977). 
91. The Judiciary Act of 1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790, for the 
first time authorized review in cases where the state court 
"may hav~ been in favor of the validi~y of the treaty or 
statute or authority exercised under the United States" or 
"against the validity of the State statute or authority 
cla~ed to be repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or 
laws of the United States" or "in favor of the title, 
right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution, 
treaty, statute, commission, or authority of the United 
States." Since 1914, periodic revisions have juggled the 
types of cases falling within the Court's discretionary 
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certiorari jurisdiction w±thout otherwise substantially 
affecting its jurisdiction . See generally ~fJ~ E~~~~gJ: 
~Q~~~~, supra note 90, at 44o-41. 
92. See, e.~., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). 
93. See, ~·~·, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
94. See, ~- ~·, Williams v. Georgi.a, 349 U.S. 375 (1955). 
See generally ~tU! E~g~~gJ: ~~~~~~, supra note 90, at 470-573. 
,...... 
95. A typical case is Section 10-(b) of the Securities 
Exchange of 1934, 15 u.s.c. § 78j (b), which in broad 
terms prohibits fraudulent securities transactions and 
has been interpreted to authorize victims of fraud to sue 
to recover losses caused by violations of the statute. 
96. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FBI, 403 U.S. 
388 ( 19 71) . · Bivens created a right against federal officers. 
Cf. the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1964), 
creating a cause of action for state violations of federal 
rights. 
97. See, ~- ~ · , Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 u.s. 610 
(1895). Cf. Holmberg v. Ar.mbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) 
(state statutes offer guidance, but are not conclusive, 
in suits at equity). See generally, Th~ E~g~~~J: ~~~~s~, 
supra note 9~ at 825-29; Hill, State Procedural Law in 
Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 ~g~· ~- ~~~- - 66 (1955); 
Note, A Limitation on Actions for Deprivation of Federal 
Rights, 68 ~J:~· ~· ~~~· 763 (1968) 1 Note, Federal Statutes 
Without Limitations Provisions. 53 ~~J:~· ~- ~~~· 68 (1953). 
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98. _ See,~-~., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 u.s. 392 
(1946). The doctrine has been lbmited somewhat to cases 
involving fraud or concealment. Cf. Russell v. Todd, 309 
u.s. 280, 287-89 (1940) (suggesting that in the absence of 
fraud, the state statute is usually allowed to control). 
99. See§§ III. A. and B., supra. 
100. U.S. Canst. art. VI, cl. 2. 
101. The First Amendment speaks to "Congress"; the 
Seventh to "any Court of the United States." 
1 0 2 . Barron v. Mayor of Bal ti.more, 3 2 U.S . ( 7 Pet. ) 
243 (1833). 
103. U.S. Canst. art. 1, § 10. 
104. U.S. Canst. amend XIV, 
§.-.. 
- 1. 
1 OS. A catalogue of the rights made applicable to the 
states may be found in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968) and, as of a more recent date, in Friendly, 
Federalism: A Foreword, 86 ~g~~ ~· ~· 1019, 1027 (1977). 
106 . By contrast the United States Congress was 
initially established largely to facilitate the common 
defense of thirteen states during the American war of 
independence. Thus, under the Articles of Confederation, 
Congress had no power to lay taxes or regulate commerce, 
while the states, on the other hand, were forbidden without 
congressional consent to send or receive ambassadors, to 
enter into agreements or treaties with foreign powers or 
among themselves, or to maintain ships of war or troops 
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(excepting a militia, which had to be provided) in t~e 
of peace (art. VI). Neither could the states engage 
in war unless invaded or in ~ediate danger of Indian 
attack . (id.). See generally ~-~-~~~l1 & ~-~· ~g~ai§Q~, 
~b~ 8rn~~~gn ~Q!},i:!;J.~j;JaQn: l~~ Q~~~~~ gng Q~X§lQ~m~n:~;, 
dh. 4 (4th ed. 1970). The Articles of Con£ederation may 
be read in id., app. 1 • 
107. See Weiler, supra note 3, at 36-38 (discussing 
the e££ect of the Luxembourg Accords); Pescatore, 
L'Ex~cuti£ communautaire: Justi£ication du guadrioartisme 
institu~ par les trait~s de Paris et de Rome, i197§7 Ca~ier 
~ dr~~ ~OE~~n 387, 395 n. 3. 
108. Prominent exceptions include the Management 
Commi. t tees. See ~~~~!.12!: ~ ~~ ~YI012§S!l ~Qmmg~J:~i~§, 
~~unci! gn~ ~~~Qn ~mmit:!;~es, Supplement 2/80 Bull. 
E.C. (1980); Weiler, supra note 3, at 41-42. It should 
be noted, however, that the Council formally relies on 
the Commission for dra£t legislation and that the Council 
can amend a Commission proposal only by unanimous vote (art. 
149 EEC Treaty) which in theory and perhaps in fact makes it 
easier to adopt t;han amend Commission proposals. See 
~· ~~ & i· Hs;9l, ~~~~~I 5-09 (1973). 
109. The principal exception is of course Community 
competition law. ~ arts. 87 (d) & 89 EEC Treaty. 
110. · Probably most prominent of the frailties common 
to both the European Community and the original thirteen 
American states are fiscal constraints and executive 
weakness. The United States Congress under the Articles 
of Confederation lacked power to levy taxes and had to rely 
on state appropriations to fund the national debt incurred 
during the war of independence; ~notes 67 and 106, 
supra. These appropriations were--------------------------~ 
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to be "supplied by the several States, in proportion to 
the value of all land within each state ... estimated 
according to such mode as the United States in Congress 
assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint." 
Art. VIII. However, the requested revenues were 
frequently withheld by the states, and all attempts to 
amend the Articles to permit Congress to levy _a direct 
duty on imported goods, thus assuring a reliable income, 
failed to receive the unanimity required for adoption of 
amendments. See generally McLaughlin, The Articles of 
Confederation, in ~ggg~g, supra note 66, at 44, 57-59. 
The expenditures of the European Community are theoretically 
funded by the Community's "own resources," but in fact 
an important part of the funds comes from the Member States, 
which have not been reluctant to protest real or perceived 
inequities in the allocation of Community receipts and 
disbursements or even to refuse to make full budgetary 
contributions. And, Community fiscal control is further 
weakened by the bizarre division ofbudgetary powers 
between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, 
Parllarrent seemingly 
- \>lim- the I intent to compensate for its weakness in other 
areas by acting vigorously on the Council's budget proposals. 
For details of recent disputes see, ~-~·' Pipkorn, Legal 
Implications of the Absence of the Community Budget at the 
Beginning of a Financial Year, 18 ~£mm· ~~- ~- ~~~· 141 
(1981); Sopwith, Legal Aspects of the Community Budget, 
11 ~£mm· ~~- ~- ~~x- 31s (1980). 
111. It also has considerable powers to regulate commerce, 
of which the U.S. Congress under the Articles of 
Confederation had none. Interestingly, the lack of this 
power made it extremely difficult for the United States to 





as it had• As one scholar has written,n~ failure to 
grant Congress complete power to regulate commerce rendered 
it difficult or impossible to make a commercial treaty with 
a foreign nation and to have assurance that the states 
would comply with its provisions.n McLaughin, supra note 
110, at 54. A number of states breached even the treaty 
establishing peace with England at the end of the Revolution. 
Elkins & McKitrick, The Founding Fathers, 76 ~Qlit~£~! g~~· Q· 
217, 208-09 (1961). By contrast, the European Community, 
which would seem to possess considerably more circumscribed 
treaty-m~ing powers than did the American Congress under 
the Articles of Confederation, has managed through 
preemptive legislation and broad interpretations of its 
powers by the Court -of Justice to establish credible treaty-
making powers. For the expressly granted powers, cc::rrca.re 
Articles of Confederation, art. IX with arts. 113, 229-231 
& 238 EEC~~r the principal decisions of the E~ ~ of 
Justice expansively defining the Community's treaty-making 
(Pe the 
powers,~ Commission v. Council )European · Road Transport 
Agreement, ERTA), L197!7 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263, L197!7 
Comm. Mkt. L. ~. 335; and the decisions discussed in 
.;.. --
Pescatore, External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities, 16 ~Qmm. ~~· ~· ~~· 
615 (1979). See also Wellenstein, Twenty-Five Years of 
European Community External Relations , 1 6 ~QIDm. M&~. ~. ~gy. 
407 (1979). 
Of course, having a court does not mean very much 
if its decisions are not obeyed. For the record of 
disobedience i~ the Onited States, ~ ~b~~'' supra note 
14, at 140-150. 
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112. See Weiler, supra note 3, at 8 n. 28: 
mconstitutionalization' implies a combined and circular 
process by which the Treaties were interpreted by techniques 
associated with constitutional documents rather than 
multipartite treaties and in which the Treaties both as 
cause and effect assumed the 'higher law' attributes of a 
constitution.n 
113. Preliminary Ruling, Costa v. ENEL, L19617 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 585, L19617 comm. Mkt. L. R. 425; reprinted in 
~g~~g~g~~~~=~g~g~~l=~g~, supra note 2, at 117-119, 121-127, 
followed by the ~portant conclusions by Advocate General 
M. Lagrange at 127-130. 
114. See,~-~·' Preliminary Rulind, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfufir~ Vorratsstelle fllr 
Getreide und Futter.mittel, i197Q/ ~. Oomm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 
L197~7 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 255·, reprinted in ~- ~~~]:n, ~- ~g~ 
& ~- ~g~l~~g~~~' ~~E~~~g~=~gmm~i~~-~g~=g~~-l~gti~~~~Qn§ 
in Perspective 278, 279-280 (1976) Lhereinafter cited as 
~~~~~~g~-~gmm~~~~=~g~/. 
115. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) signed in Paris on April 18, 1951; Treaties 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), signed in Rome 
on March 25, 1957. 
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11 6 • The juris prudence commences with Preliminary 
Ruling, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administr~tie der 
Belastingen, L196~/ E. Comm. ~t. J. Rep. 1 (holding that 
subject to certain conditions, provisions of the EEC Treaty 
bestowed enforceable rights and obligations as between 
individuals and Member States) and has since branched in 
many directions. See, ~-~·' Preliminary Ruling, Belgische 
Radio en Televisie v. SABAM, L197~/ E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
51, L197!i 2 ~omm. Mkt. L. R. 238 1bololng-Enat articles 
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty may create rights and duties as 
among private parties, ~., that they may have "horizontal~ 
direct effect); Prelimin~ Ruling, Franz Grad~· Finan-
z~t Tr~unstei~, L197Q/ E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 825, L19717 
1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 177 (holding that a directive may 
create rights and duties as between private parties 
and-.th~e.rnment of the Member States, i.e., that they 
may have •vertical" direct effect) . See generally~· ~s~t & 
~~ ~~!~~d, Ih~~ubstantiy~-_;~~-o~-.tb~~gg~ ch. 3 (1980). 
As for whetner directives may have "horizontal" effect, 
~ Easson, Can Directives Impose Obl~gations on 
Individuals?, 4 ~· ~- B~Y· 67 (1979); Timmer.mans, 
Directives: Their E·ffect Within National Legal Systems, 
16 ~a~·~-~· j;~- 533 (1979). For remaining 
differences between the effect of regulations and 
directives, ~g. at 553'-54; Winter, Direct Applicability 
and Direct Effect. Two Distinct and Different Concepts in 
Community Law, 9 ~- ~- ~· ~· 425 (1972J. 
117. Of course, the Court of Justice itself has "original," 
indeed exclusive, jurisdiction in certain cases arising 
under the Treaties. See, ~·~·' arts. 169, 170, 173, 175 
& 178-83 EEC Treaty. 
(§y;1dicat g~n~ral des Fa£ricants de semoule~ de _France/ 
118. Judgment of March 1, 1968,/Conseil d'!tat, L196~/ 
Lebon 149~nglish translation at L197Qi Comm. Mkt. L: R. 




recent Cohn-Bendit case, Judgment of December 22, 1978, 
Conseil ;.:d'~tat,. L197§/ Lebon 524, Er..glish translation at 
L198Q/ 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 524, where it refused to follow 
Court of Justice preceden~s concerning the direct effect of 
directives, ~note 116 supra, and relying on the "acte 
clair " doctrine, ~text at notes 156-57, infra, held 
that directives may not be invoked by the citizens of 
Member States against an individual administrative ac~ 
The position taken in the 1968 Semoules case was confirmed 
in Judgment of October 22, 1979, Onion Democratique du travail, 
Conseil d'~tat, L197z7 Lebon 383; and7~udgment of 
October 22, 1979, Election des repr~tants A 1 'Assembl~e 
des Communautes europeenes, Conseil d'~tat, L197~/ 
Lebon 385. 
119. Judgment of May 24, 1975, Cass. ch. mixte, L1972i 
Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence LD.S.Jur~7 497, English 
translation (edited) in ~£mi~~st~Y~ ~Qn§t~~ ~~' supra 
note 2, at 156-158 (including excerpts from the important 
submissions to the COurt by Procureur Gen~ral A. Touffait). 
See also Judgment of December 5, 1978 Barouc Cheri£, 
Cass. crim., Li'9127 o.s. Jur. SO. 
120. ~ ~gm~~a~t~X~ ~Qn§~~~ ~~~' supra note 2, at 
161-163, and the comments at 169. 
121. Id. at 169. 
122. ~It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who 
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict 
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation 
of each •••• This is of the very essence of judicial duty." 
Marbury v. Madison~ 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-178 (1803) 
(emphasis added) • The idea was already emphasized by 
Alexander ~am!l~g, [ederal!st No. 78: "The interpretation 
of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts. A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded 
by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs 
to them to ascertain its meaninq as well as the meaning of 
any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. 
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If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance 
between the two, that which has the superior obligation 
and validity ought of course to be preferred " 
(Emphasis added.) 
123. For other instances of French defiance suggesting 
that one should not be too hopeful, ~ Proposition de loi 
portant r~tablissement de la souverainet~ de la R~publique 
en matiere d'~nergie nucl~aire, No. 917, Assembl~e Nationale, 
2eme session extraordinaire de 1978-79; Editorial Comments, 
The Mutton and Lamb Story: Isolated Incident or the 
Beginning of a New Era?, 17 ~~· ~~· ~- ~~~· 311 (1980). 
124. For the sake of precision, it should be mentioned 
that direct effect is limited, naturally enough, to those 
Community provisions which impose clear, precise, and 
unconditioned obligations. See, ~-~·, Preliminary Ruling, 
Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office, {197_4iE. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
1337, 1354, L197~/ 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R~ 1, 9 (submissions 
of the Advocate General Mayras) • 
125. See Preliminary Ruling, Amministrazione delle 
Finanze della State v. SLmmenthal Spa (No. 2), L197§7 
E. Camm. Ct. J. Rep. 629, L197§7 3 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 263. 
There the Court of Justice ruled that in the case of a 
conflict between Community law and national law the 
national courts must apply Community law without waiting 
for any national procedure to determine the inapplicability 
of national law. The Italian Constitutional Court had 
previously required all such conflicts to be first referred 
to itself for a declaration of unconstitutionality of 
national law which was in violation of Community law. 
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Treaty; Treaty; 
126. Art. 177 EEC /art. 150 EAEC /art. 41 ECSC Treaty. 
For a brief but penetrating analysis of the parallels 
between U.S. federalism and Community constitutional 
developments ~ Casper, The Emerging Constitution of the 
European Community, 24 T~~=~==g~~==B§~·- ~==~~~- 5 (1978). 
127. The prevailing doctrine is that the courts of all 
Member S~ates are bound either to aaopt the European Court's 
interpretation of Community law or to resubmit the question 
to the Court for a new ruling. Cf. Prel~inary Ruling, 
Da Costa en Schaake N.V. v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, 
L19617 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 31, L19617 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 224. 
Whether the Court's prel~inary rulings under Article 177 
have an "erga omnes" effect is apparently a controversial 
question, although it is hard to understand why given their 
clear precedential value. The arguments for and against 
such an effect are discussed in Trabucchi, L'effet "erga 
omnes" des decisions prejudicielles rendues par la Cour de 
justice des Communautes europeennes, 10 ~~~~ ~~!ID§g~~~~11~ 
~~ ~~g~~ ~~~Q~~~~ 56 (1974) and were strenuously contested 
by the parties in the S~enthal case, L197~7 E. Co~. Ct. 
J. Rep. 629, L197~/ 3, Comm. Mkt. L. R. 263. The Court, 
however, declined to discuss the issue. 
128. For a description of this development see ~~~g~~g~ 
~gmm~i:~~ ~g~, supra note 114, at 214-242. 
129. See the discussion in id. at 96-102, 242-261. 
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130. See ~ygi£1~1 B§Yi§~, su~a note 2 , at 49, 59. 
- --------.----- of - titutionality f legislation 
On the acceptance of Judicial rev~e~n Ireland an8 Greece, 
~ ~:.M.:. '"'~~~~~' ~~g~~in~-~~~~~_!g~=~~~~~~=~~~~=g=g~g~~~ 
rQ~~~~=~n_gs~1~grne~~~~~=g~~~~IDg£Y~=~~~=~~~g~-~~~~~l~~~~, 
Document I.U.E. 174/78 (European University Institute, 
Human Rights Colloquium, June 14-17, 1978); ~=~· ~~±1~, 
~~~gm§nta~ ~gb~g=~n_ttg_~~iah ~s~-g~~=~Q~g~~~~~~~~ 15-36 
(2d ed. 1967); and Perifan~i Rotolo; La Corte .suprema nella 
Costituzione greca del 1975, 29 ~Y~~~g ~~~m· ~l ~~~~~~~ 
~~~~~~~ 183 (1979). On the constitutional position of 
Ireland and Denmark vis-!-vis Community law, ~ Lang, 
Legal and Constitutional Implications for Ireland of 
Adhesion to the EEC Treaty, 9 ~QIDm· ~~- . ~· ~~~· 167 (1972); 
and Due and Gulmann, Constitutional Implications of 
Denmark's Accession, 9 ~~~= ~~- ~· B~~· 256 (1972). 
On the constitutional position of Greece, ~ Evrigenis, 
Legal and Constitutional Implications of Greek Accession 
to the European Communities, 17 ~~~· ~~· ~· ~~~· 157 (1980) . 
131. In addition to the discussions in ~QIDQs~g~~~~ ~Qna~~~ 
La~ , supra note 2, at 132-145, ~' ~-~·' Winterton, The 
British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined, 
92 ~·Q· ~~~· 591 (1976); Warner, The Relationship Between 
European Community Law and the Laws of Member States, 93 
~·Q· ~~~· 349, 364-366 (1977); Mitchell, Sed Quis castodiet 
Ipsos Custodes?, 11 ~Q~· ~~· -~. ~~~. 3 75 ( 1.974); We.ls~, 
I 
European Economic Community Law Versus United Kingdom Law: 
A Doctrinal Dilemma, 53~~~·~·~~~· 1032 (1975); Trindade, 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Primacy of European 
Community Law, 35 ~~~· ~· ~~~· 375 (1972); among the most 
recent discussions, Jaconelli, Constitutional Review and 
Section _2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972, 28 
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~nt~~ & ~~mg. ~· g. 65 (1979). 
132. ~Winterton) supra note 131. 
133. European Communities Act 1972, c. 68. 
134. On the various aspects of the "decline," in 
recent years, of Parliamentary supremacy in the United 
Kingdom ~' ~-~, Koopmans, supra note 13, at 319-322. 
Treaty. 
135. See especially art. 3 EEC.I Cf. the comment of 
Professor Waelbroeck that "L~7t is not likely that the 
Court Lof Justic~7 would go as far as the u.s. Supreme 
Court in the Prudential case LPrudential Insurance Co. 
v. Benjamin, 328 u.s. 408 (194817 and recognize that the 
power of the Council to regulate intra-Community trade 
is not restricted by any Limitation which forbids it 
to discriminate against inter-State commerce and in favour 
of local trade." Waelbroeck, supra note 79, at 4. 
136. Many have tried to place the Community in relation 
to established forms of government. For a recent review of 
this literature,~ Weiler, supra note 3, at 3-11. 
137. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 u.s. (4 Wheat.} 316, 
421 (1819}. 
Treaty; Treaty; Treaty. 
138. Art. 235 EEC I art. 95, par. 1 ECSC I art. 203 EAEC I 
These articles, although not identical, in general provide 
procedures for taking appropriate measures.. which are 
necessary to attain Community objectives but have not been 
specifically included among the Community's powers. ~ 
With regard to the Court' s implied powers jurisprudence, 
i1 
~generally the good study by ~- "'Mgnn, Th~unction_Qf 
Jud1~1gl~~£iaiog in_gu~g~~gn~~Qn~m~~~~ij~gg~stiQn 288-99 
(19 72} • 
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139. Camti.ssion v. Council (~ ~==:::-~~-:----~-. y-__ _ 
t.he European Road Transport Agreement, ERTA)
1 
~(T 9717 E. 
Comm. Ct. J.Rep.263; L19717 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 335. 
140. I.taly v. High Authority,-----------
L196Q/ E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. - 325. 
141. In light of the activities undertaken by federal 
governments today, it cannot but seem quaint that one 
of the most controversial questions in early American 
constitutional law, and the question presented in the 
McCUlloch case, was whether Congress had the power to 
establish a national bank. 
142. However, there is nothing in the Treaties that 
would prohibit creation of an executive branch by the 
Community. 
143. There are, of course, different ways of 
dj.stributing powers. See, ~·~·, the British North 
American Act, 1867, Canada's Constj.tution, which instead 
of employing a residuary clause to defj.ne Provincial 
powers enumerates both Domdnj.on and Provincial powers 
and grants the residue to the federal Parliament, and 
~ ~·~· ~ & I·~· ~§~~~afJ, ~gn~dian=~Qnsll~t~QIH~l 
~ 4/19-20 {1977) for the way in which thii affects 
questions of the constitutional valj.dity of legislation. 
One result of the fact that specific powers were granted 
to the Provinces would appear to be that the idea that 
federal powers are constj.tutj.onally lj.mited is much more 
' alj.ve today in Canada than in the Onited States. The extent 
of the difference is evident in contemporary American and 
Canadian legal scholarshj.p. For example, Professor Choper 
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has recently argued that the U.S. Supreme Court unneces-
sarily expends "institutional capital" on reviewing 
federalism cases, capital better spent on the protection 
of civil liberties. ~hQ~~~, supra note 14, ch.4. ~e 
therefore urge~ the Court ta treat these allocation of 
powers issues as nonjusticiable. But is there anything 
to be gained by ignoring these issues? As Professor 
Monaghan observes in his review of Professor Choper•s 
book, 94 ~~~·~·~· 296, 301 (1980), "Lg/onstitutional 
battles over the allocation of power between nation and 
states occupied center stage for close to two centuries 
~our constitutional history, but those battles are now 
over, and their results generally accepted." He might 
have added that it was the federal government that 
emerged victor~ous from these battles. This attitude 
contrasts nicely with that~,~-~·, ~.g. Scott, ~§sa~ 
Qn th~ ~.QnstJ.j;uj;ion (1977) in which judicial decisions 
restrictiyely _~efining Dominion 
powers bear much the same onus that substantive due 
process decisions have borne in American academic tradition. 
144. ~, ~·S•t Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 u.s. 
(12 How.) 299 (1851), discussed in I III.B.t .. ~ supra. 
145. ~, £·S·, arts. 1-3 EEC . Treaty. 
146. ~ generally Hart, The Relations Between State 
and Federal Law, 54 ~Ql~. r-· ~~~· 489 (1954). 
147. ~generally Weiler, supra note 3, at 20-23 and 
Waelbroeck, supra note 79, passim. 
148. Weiler, supra note 3, at 23. 
149. ~-S·, a Court of Cassation and a Conseil 4'Etat, 
as in France, Italy and Belgium: or a B·undesaerichtshof, 
a B·undesverwaltungsgericht, a Bundesfi·nanzhof , _.a . 
B·undesa:rbeitsgericht, and a Bundessozialqericht, as in 
Germany, each of which is supreme· within its jurisdiction. 
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Treaty; Treaty; Treaty. 
150. Art. 177 EEC /art. 41 ECSC : /art. 150 EAEC./ For 
the sake of completeness, it should be added that in the 
legal order of the European Community, judicial review 
of legislation manifests itself in at least ~~ree aspects. 
The European Court of Justice is empowered to review the . 
validity of the supranational legislation ("secondary" 
Community law) emanating from Community organs. s·ee 
TI;eaty. 
especially arts. 173, 1 74 '· 184 and 177 (b) EEC; I~ addition, 
the Court can review national legislation indirectly,!·~·, 
when the Commission or another member state challenges _.· 
such legislation as violative of Treaty obligations. s·ee 
. Treaty. 
especially Arts. 169 and 170 EEC I The third aspect, 
the most interesting for our purposes, is discussed in 
the text. 
151. Such is clearly implied by the last paragr2Ph of 
Tr~atv, 
Article 177 EEC :;wh~Ch requires referrals for a 
preliminary ruling by national courts from which there 
is no appe~l. 
152. ~Preliminary Ruling, Da Costa en Schaake N.V. 
v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, L196~/ E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 31, L196~7 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 224 where the Court 
of Justice took the view that a court of last instance 
need not refer an issue for a preliminary ruling if the 
issue has been authoritatively decided by the Court in 
an· earlier case. 
153. Id. -
154. As to the requirement of "dubiousness,". see 
~~' supra note 138, at 386-94. 
155. g. at 387 and. n. 338. 
156. The reference is to 1 ~~~ri~!~' ~n~~~ g~ ~ 
m~~~•~; ~~~~~a,g~~ 498 <1896). / 
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157. The most egregious instance being the £2££-
Bendit case, Judgment of December 22, 1978, L197§7 
Lebon 524, English translation in L198Q/ 1 Comm. Mkt. L. 
R. 543, where the Conseil, citing the acte clair doctrine, 
both ignored Courtof Justice precedent concerning the 
possible direct effect of directives and refused to 
refer the issue to the Court. See note 118, supra. 
158. ~Weiler, supra note 3, at 65-83. 
159. See§ III.c., supra. 
160. Preliminary Ruling, Rewe-Zentralfinanz _v. 
Landwirtschaftskammer Westfalen-Lippe, L19727 E. Comm. Ct. - --J. Rep. 1039, L1971/ 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 533. Discussed 
in Weiler, supra note 3, at 69-77. That such principles 
should be taken seriously is perhaps al;~ady suggested by 
the Simmenthal case, discussed supra note 125, where the 
Court refused to permit national appellate procedures 
to interfere with the immediacy of Community law. 
161. "Lf/he builders of the European Communities 
thought too little about the legal foundations of their 
edifice and paid too little attention to the protection 
of the basic rights of the individual within the new 
European structure." Pescatore, Address on the Application 
of Community Law in Each of the Member States, .in VI ~Y~ 
~~~~~~~~Ull~~~!a~~~~mm~i t~L-~gg~jb~g 
~sg~mic::S;~ni~l:~n£~~~~~~~1: 12-Z~ 2 6 ( 1 97 6) • 
162. See note 7, supra. The twenty-first member of 
the Council of Europe, Lichtenstein, unlike all the other' -.. 
members, has yet to ratify the Convention • 
. / 
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163. l·~·, of the "self-executing" norms of the 
Convention. These include most of the Convention's first 
Section which defines the "rights and freedoms" the 
Convention intends to protect. 
164. See generally ~~~~2~3~~~~=~~~~~~l-1s~, supra 
note 2, at 145; A. Drzemczewski, The Domestic Status of 
the European Convention on Human Rights: New Dimensions, 
1977/1 ~~ggl IgSU~§_Of=~~~QE~g~=Jn~~gra~~£~ 1. 
165. On the Universal Declaration~~-~., ~- §~~~ 
and ~. ~~~~~n ~gl, Ih~=~~~P-lg~~n§J:=E~£1!~~.t~£~=~~=~~~ 
~~g~j!~ (1973). 
166. ~ ~£~~g~2.t~~~-E~~~~~J:-1g~, supra note 2, at 
145-148. 
167. Art. 25 of the Convention stipulates that: "The 
Commission may receive petitions addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe from any person, 
non-governmental organization or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the 
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this 
Convention, provided that the High Contracting Party 
against wh±ch the complaint has been lodged has declared 
that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to 
receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting 
Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not 
to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right." 
On this important and profoundly innovative provision of 
the European Convention,~,~-~·' ~-~·~g£~g~, I~~ 
~~~~~g~~~~~~~ti~~_Q~=H-um~=~~gn.t~ 62 (1975). 
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168. Despite the ongoing "great debate" in the United 
Kingdom, ~ ! IV.A.4, supra, there is no national Bill of 
Rights to be enforced by the British courts. Cf. C.L. 
Blackj Jr., Is There Already a British Bill of Rights? 
89 ~=~=~~X· 173 (1973). Moreover, British citizens are 
not entitled to claim enforcement of the Convention on 
Human Rights in their national courts. And yet, ironically 
enough, since 1966 British citizens have been entitled 
to bring their claims of human rights violations by 
British state action of the transnational Bill of Rights 
to the international adjudicators in Strasbourg 
in France. 
i •~• 1 
The situation is no less paradoxical in France, 
of 
however·~ On the basisjCafes Jacques Vabre, the French 
citizens would be entitled to claim enforcement of the 
European Bill of Rights by their national courts. On 
the other hand, the optional clause of art. 25 of the 
Convention has not yet been accepted by France, although 
the new government has promised to do so: French citizens 
are thus not yet entitled to bring their claims to 
Strasbourg. 
169. Based on the 1980 estimates, as published 
in l2~l ~~!~~~!£g ~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~g~, the population of 
the fifteen countries amounts to slightly over 280,000,000. 
___.____ - - -- - -- ... - -- - -··-· -- . 
170. See arts. 187, 192 EEC..Treaty. 
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171. Examples of such decisions can be found in 
~~mgg~g~~~~=~~~~~~l=~g~, supra note 2, at 238 (European 
Commission of Human Rights, Decision of December 16, 1970, 
Knechtl v. United Kingdom, L197Q/ 13 ~=~==~~~==~~~~· 
~~=HYmgg_E~g~!~ 730); 240 (European Court of Human Rights, 
Decision of February 21, 1975, Golder v. United Kingdom, 
L1975/ 18 X~· ~y~~-~Qn~_Qn HYmsn-E~gh~~ 290); 297 - ---==------------==------------
(Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
Resolution of September 16, 1963, Pataki v. Austria and 
Dunshirn v. Austria, L196~7 6 I:~==~Y~==~~g~==~~ H~g~ 
~~sh!~ 714); 429 (European Commission of Human Rights, 
Decision of July 14, 1972, Gussenbauer v. Austria, L197~7 
15 x~~=~¥~==~gnv==~g=~~g~=~~g~!~ 558). 
of course, 
173. Id. Madisoqlwas later to change his mind and to 
become a leading advocate of a Bill of Rights. 
174. We will only mention one landmark decision -by 
the Court of Justice of the European Communi ties on the 
issue of sex discrimination, Preliminary Ruling, Gabrielle 
Defrenne v. Soci!t! Anonyme Belge de Navigation A!rienne 
Sabena, L197§/ E.Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455, L197§7 2 Comm. Mkt. 
L.R. 98. In this case, the Court of Justice enforced 
against a private party in Belgium the requirement in 
art. 119 EEC of equal pay for equal work by men and women. 
For practical reasons, and at the request of the 
governments of the U.K. and Ireland, the Court made its 
oqly 
ruling/prospective in application (i.e., it would not apply 
to discriminations which occurred before Defrenne was 
decided, except for those cases already filed at the time 
of that decision). 
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175. Judgment of May 29, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht 
L1971f 37 BVerfGE 271; English translation in ~~m~~Eg~~~~ 
~~~g~~~=~g~, supra note 2, ~ 178-187. 
176. Id. at 187. 
177. The German Court, in fact, emphasized that its 
decision was of a merely provisional nature. The Court 
declared that as long as the European Parliament is not 
democratically legitimized (i.e. elected by universal 
is not endowed with actuar legislative powers, 
suffrage),/and has not enacted a B~ll of Rights adequate 
in comparison with the fundamental rights contained in 
the German Constitution, the Court retains the power to 
review Community regulations for violation of basic rights 
guaranteed by the German Constitution. Id. at 180-182. 
178. L19627 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419, 425, L197Q/ Comm. 
Mkt. L. R. 112, 119. 
179. L1971f E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, L19717 2 Comm. 
Mkt. L. R. 338; reprinted in ~~m29ra~~Y~=~~~g~~l=~g~, 
supra note 2, at 192-194. 
180. L197!/ E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 507, 2 Comm. Mkt. 
L. R. at 354. 
181. This point was affirmed by the European Court of 
Justice already in 1970, Preliminary Ruling, Internationale 
Hande~esellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur 
Getreide und Futter.mittel, L197Q/ E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 
1134, L1971f Comm. Mkt. L. R. 1255, 1283, where the Court, 
after saying that "respect for fundamental rights has an 
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integral part in the general principles of law of which 
the Court of Justice ensures respect," stated that: 
"The protection of such rights, while inspired by the 
constitutional principles common to the Member-States 
must be ensured within the framework of the Community's 
structure and objectives." 
182. In a later decision, the reference to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which in ~was 
merely ~plicit, was made explicit. Preliminary Ruling, 
Rutili v. Minister of Interior, L197~7 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 1219, L197§7 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 140. 
183. Barron v. Mayor of Balt~ore, 32 U.S.(7 Pet.) 
243 (1833). 
184. L197ai E. Comm. ct. J. Rep. 1219, L197§7 1 Comm. 
Mkt. L. R. 140. 
185. L197ai E. comm. ct. J. Rep. at 1231, L197§7 1 
Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 155. 
186. ~, !.·~·, San Antonio School District v·. 
Rodriguez, 411 u.s. 1 {1973); ~generally Karst, 
Foreword: Egual Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 91 baL..ka.~U· 1 (1977): Brest, Foreword: 
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 
UArv·.H~.Bli· 1 <1976>. 
187. See ! III.O., supra. 
188. A comparative· study by M. Cappelletti now being 
published in ~Qn~~Q~=H~-R~., from which the following 
section is drawn, deals more generally with the law-making 
power of judges, its mode, legitimacy, and limits. We 
refer to it for a more complete discussion. 
- 137 -
189. See § II, supra. 
190. This is obviously so if one considers that the 
German Court itself was engaging in judicial review. 
191-. Judgment of May 29, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
L197~/ 37 BVerfGE 271, L197i/ 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 540, 
550-51 (English translation). 
192. L197~/ 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 563-64. 
193.. ~! II.C.t, supra. 
19•4. See § II.~r supra. 
195. ~Unwritten Constitution, supra note 14, at 
705; sse also ~·X' supra note 14, ch. 1. 
1 9 Q. M::lracver if we '..ere going to be clause-bound about it, 
surely we r make a strong case for the Court's 
supremacy on the basis of arts. 164 and 177 EEC Trea:ty .. 
19 7.. ~ ~ III.D., supra. 
198. .2!!.' !.·S!· ·' ~l:!' supra note 14, ch. 3. 
199. ~ text at notes 56-62, supra. 
200. £'rmpal:e the strong language of the First Amendment 
to the u.s. Constitution guaranteeing freedom of spee~~ 
with the u.s. Supreme Court's deplorable free speech 
opinions during World War I, discussed in Chafee, 
Freedom of Speech in War 'rime, 32 ~~~· ~· ~~~· 932 
(1919). .2!!. also Rabban, The First Amendment in its 




2.01. ~ the ·analysis 1 Il controllo di costituzionalitA 
delle leggi nel quadro delle funzioni dello Stato, 15 
Ei~~~~-~~~~a~~:to:::ia~~~~~gJ:~ 376 (1960). cf. ~· gtlgBJ:ro, 
~~~do~~!:=iW~b: ~~~~~Iem~E~.YJ:~~nd=JugJ:~~g1:~~~,!ew 
36-37 (1966) Lhereinafter cited as ~~g~m ~! ~~~~j, 
and more recently,~· iggi~~Q, ~~~~~~: ~=~om~~~~~~~.and 
~~l~J:cal ~g*XS~~ (1981) where the author concludes 
that these qualities are nowhere perfectly attained. 
This of course ·is true, but from that truth one ·needs 
not conclude that they do not nonetheless represent 
the essential characteristics, as imperfect as they are, 
of the judicial process • 
.._ ~ t 
~or the provisions designed to guarantee the independence 
and impartiality of the Judges of the Court of Justice, 
~especially arts. 3 ~Lmmunity from legal proceedings), 
4 (disqualifi~ation from holding political office or 
engaging in other occupationsh 6 (removal only on unanimous 
vote of~~er Ju4ges and Advocates General) and 16 
(disqualification for conflicts of interest) of the Statute 
of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community, 
siqned in Brussels on April 17, 1957. 
"preliminary rulingn EEC Treaty, 
202 • In general, in/cases governed by Article 177/ the 
parties ·to the suit, the Member States, the Commission 
and where appropriate the Council are entitled to submit-~ 
statements of case or written observations to the Court 
Statuta of the C8urt, cit., 
of Justice.. ~ I" art. 2 ; ~ generally Mortelmans, 
Observations in the Cases governed by Article 177 of the 
EEC Treaty: p·rocedure and Practice, 1 6 ~~;, .~~~=.!~~:- ... 
55 7 ( 1 9 7 9 ) • / J;• 
- 139 -
203. Whereas all Western legal systems, including the 
Community system, rather uniformly adhere to the rule 
that a judicial proceeding, whether civil or criminal, 
cannot be commenced by a court on its own motion, the 
further unfolding of the case, once commenced, is 
frequently subject to _the court's control. ~' ~-~·' 
the excellent discussion in E· ~gm~g, Jr. & ~- ~g~g~~' ~~., 
~~Yil ~~Q~~~~I~ 4-8 (2nd ed. 1977); ~ ~ ~- ~~~~~~~~~~' 
~I~~~~g~ ~ ~g~~J:~g£~ . _ 1 6 9-21 8 < 1 9 6 9) • 
204. As Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the o.s. 
Supreme Court, said in 1971: 
It is significant that most of the provisions 
of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it 
is procedure that marks much of the difference 
between rule by law and rule by fiat. 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 o.s. 433, 436 (1971) • 
. . . -- -- --- - .. ----- -- -----
2 OS. Note, for example, that the oore of "fw:1damen tal 
rights" that scholars have found to be common to most 
Western legal systems are procedural. See ~Qm~g~g~~~~ 
Co~~~~~=~g~, supra note 2, chs. VI-::a. By contrast, courts 
have differed markedly over such "fundamental" substantive 
rights as the right to have an abortion. See note 49, supra. 
206. This is not to say that courts may not legitimately 
act within certain limited spheres in a legislative, quasi-
legislative, or administrative capacity. When they do so, 
however, they are legislators or administrators, not judges. 
For instance, courts, especially higher courts, may have 
a procedural rule-making authority, as is the case in some 
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Common Law jurisdictions. Cf., ~-~·, ~-g· ~g~g & 
E·~· ~~~~~~~, ~gg~~~~~~ ggg ~~~~~, ~~~ ~~gl~~~ ~~gg~ 
g~~~~m 309-10, 398 (6th ed. 1977). 
207. s·ee ~ § II.c.1. i sue~a. 
208. ~ United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 
U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938). The connection of this 
reasoning to the Community, which is hardly a 
representative democracy to begin with, may seem 
attenuated. But in fact, as the German Bundesverfas• 
sungsgericht correctly recognized, the "democracy --deficit" should only strengthen the case for an active 
judicial role. The question is to whom that role should 
be given. 
2 0 ~. !!~~g~m=g,t=~~~~~~, supra note 2 tl1, at 3 7; cf. 
P. Weiler,Two Models of J"udicial Decision-Making, 46 
~g~sg~gn ~- ~.e.Y· 406, 468 (1968); Miller, supra note 34, 
at 363. Professor Shapiro in ~~~~g~m=~-~~~~~ at 34-37 
formulates the conception of a "clientele" of the Court, 
composed of "potential interest groups"which cannot achieve 
adequate support through the political branches and 
which can be best served by the Court. "Particularly 
in legislative bodies, one frequently finds that an 
overwhelming majority entertains certain sentiments, 
but few members hold those sentiments strongly enough · 
to be willing to sacrifice certain other crucial interests. 
A determined minority can then prevent the majority from 
effectuating its desires by threatening in turn the 
crucial interests of each category of members composing 
the majority •••• L~7s an example, ••. L£7or many years 
it was just not worth it to many northerners to get 
civil rights legislation which they mildly wanted at 
the expense of losing essential southern support for a 
dairy subsidy, an urban renewal program, or a highway bill, 
./ 
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which at any given moment some of them desperately needed. 
Here again the Supreme Court may be able to express public 
sentiment which cannot find a 'hard' majority elsewhere." 
Id. at 35-36. See also L. Jaffe, English and American --- ---- ===== ==-================= 
~~gg~~=~~=~g~g~~~~ (1969); ~lX' supra note 14, passim. 
Ely concludes that these "representation-reinforcing" 
qualities are fundamental to the legitimacy of judicial 
review in a democracy . 
even more ~1:reme, 
The situation in the Community is 
. since there a determined Member 
State ?- representing a small minority of the 
Community may easily block needed reforms and, more 
generally, paralyze legislative or administrative action. 
210. The anti-democratic, counter-majoritarian objection 
raised against judicial law-making is believed by some 
commentators to be especially strong when constitutional 
adjudication is involved. See, e.~., A. ~i~~gl, Ihg_L§g§~ 
. --- - - ------ ---------
~g~g~~~~~=~~gn~~ 20 (1962); ~lX' supra note 14, at 4-5. 
The argument usually made is that, whereas judicial law-
making can be repealed by legislation, at the level of 
constitutional adjudication the legislature, and thus the 
majoritarian will, is powerless unless the difficult and 
rarely used procedures of constitutional amendment are 
employed. The same argument could of course also apply 
to judicial interpretations of the Community Treaties. 
The argument, however, proves too much; if brought to its 
logical consequences it would exclude the acceptability 
of binding constitutions altogether, because such 
constitutions cannot be repealed by simple .majoritarian will. 
Surely the very idea of a binding constitution means 
recognition that there is a "higher law" above that 
expressed by the day-to-day majority in the legislature. 
211. See ~~~~~l' supra note 210, at 25-26. 
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212. Greater pains have been taken to make the Court 
perhaps, 
of Justice "representative" than is tru~,i'with most courts. 
Terms of appointment ~~~JEhg~tY(six years), and in practice 
one Judge is appointed to the ~curt from each Member State. 
213. ~~~~~l' supra note 210, at 25-26. 
214. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 
73 ~g~==~==~~~· 84, 99 (1959); ~Bickel, supra note 
210, at 27. 
215. ~Weiler, supra note 3, at 45 et passim. 
The author notes that during its first thirty years the 
Court has made remarkable contributions to the constitutional 
framework of European integration, while at the same time 
the political institutions, perhaps most notably the 
Council as a result of the Luxembourg accords,have shifted 
power back to the individual Member States. He speculates 
that these opposing trends may be causally linked. 
216. . Cf. Calabresi, Incentives, supra note 33, at 
291-307. 
217. It will not be possible fully to meet all 
that is said against judicial review. Such 
is not the way with questiqns of government • . 
We can only fill the other side of the scales 
with counter-vailing judgments on the real 
needs and the actual workings of our society 
and, of course, with our own portions of faith 
and hope. Then we can estimate how far the 
needle has moved. 
~~~~l, supra note ~0, at 24. 
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218. As John Adams noted in his diary during the 
First Continental Congress of 1774, "Tedious, indeed is 
our Business. Slow, as Snails .•.. Fifty Gentlemen 
meeting together, all Strangers, are not acquainted 
with each others Language, Ideas, Views, Designs. They 
are therefore jealous of each other -- fearfull, timid, 
skittish." &~~~~~~-~~-~~~~~~~~=~-~Q~g~~~s lJ4i=l4~~ 
(U.S. Government Printing Office 1978), reprinted in 
Int'l Herald Tribune, May 24, 1978. 
219. This is counting only the nations of Western Europe. 
220. Indeed, the most glorious eras of European 
civilization have emerged as a result of such great 
syntheses. ~ generally, Mighty p·roblem 
M· ' 
supra note 2, a~ /95-103 and accompanying text. 
221. Scheuner, Fundamental Rights in European 
Community ~~~National Constitutional ~' 12 
~QIDm==~=-1~B~~· 171, 185 (1975). See alsoP. ~~~~at~~~, 
I~~~=~~.In~~~~~~~~g 75-77 (1974): Constantinesco, in 
Q!~ang=~~~I~~i&YQ~nG~~~_l~~gy~=~~=~~~~~ d~~ 
~~~!~t~~=~ltroi~~nn~~ 205 (1965). 



